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Abstract
Third-party commercial cloud services such as Amazon Web Service, AliCloud and Azure provide
a flexible way of using computing and storage resources on demand. Moreover, using these cloud
services can significantly reduce the amount of management work, i.e., users do not need to take
care of the firmware, hareware and even the software.
Using the cloud is convenient and economical, however, on the opposite side, it brings potential
risks to users’ personal information. For example, Facebook Leak and Heartland Payment Systems
(HPY) credit card breach leak out million of personal data and credit card records. These leaks
harm user’s privacy and lead to a great economic loss. Also, data that transferred and stored in
the third-party server is out of the user’s control. Users are forced to trust cloud service providers
not to spy on their private information and must to believe them not to take record even the user
want to delete the data. Potential risks of data privacy and control-less issues are becoming the core
concerns when using commercial cloud services. Especially when the data is highly sensitive and
confidential, such as genomic data and federal records, it is difficult (even illegal) to transfer these
data to an outside cloud server.
In this dissertation, we present three primitives, i.e., ΠIP (§ 3), ΠMP (§ 4) and ΠSMP (§ 5)
using fully homomorphic encryption. These primitives are delicately designed for computing inner
products of encrypted values, but with a different requirement. Using ΠIP, we can compute a single
inner product of long vectors in a very efficient way. On the hand, ΠMP enables us to compute
iterative inner products from multiple vectors, e.g., matrix exponent. In addition, for applications
that require a smaller communication overhead, we present the third primitive ΠSMP, which is also
friendly for a weak decryptor.
The inner product functionality is the fundamental operation of many statistical computations,
such as statistic tests, descriptive statistics, predictive statistics, and machine learning. As the
concrete applications of the proposed primitives, we present three use-case applications.
• For ΠIP, we present an efficient FHE-based protocol to conduct Hardy–Weinberg Equilibrium
test and Linkage Equilibrium. More specifically, we consider two participants who provide
genomic and clinical data, respectively. Our approach is about 2000× faster than the previous
solution [Lauter et al., 2014a].
iii
• For ΠMP, we present a framework that equipped with three kinds of encodings and three
fundamental building blocks for securely outsourcing a various types of statistical analysis over
numerical, categorical and ordinal data. Moreover, we present a protocol to privately outsource
the decision tree evaluation to the cloud, which is the first construction of outsourcing such
functionality privately, to the best of our knowledge.
• For ΠSMP, we present a communication efficient secure matrix multiplication protocol. This
protocol enables us to conduct privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) evaluation in a
much more efficient manner. For instance, our matrix multiplication protocol can reduce more
than 90% computation time and communication overhead over the state-of-the-art PPML
approaches [Liu et al., 2017, Mohassel and Zhang, 2017].
iv
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Notation
Notation Description
Zt set of integers [−t/2, t/2) ∩ Z
Zt[X]/(XN + 1) set of polynomials for a 2-power number N
P [i] the i-th coefficient of the polynomial P
a χ←− S sample a from S following the distribution χ
I{P} return 1 if the predicate P is true. Otherwise return 0
v,v[i] vector and its i-th entry
M ,M [i, j] matrix and its (i, j)-th entry
M [i, :],M [:, j] the i-th row and the j-th column of matrix
〈v,u〉 inner product of vectors
Mu product of matrix and vector
(sk, pk, evk) decryption, encryption and evaluation key
u ◦ v entry-wise multiplication of two vectors
u+˙v entry-wise addition of two vectors
drc rouding the real value r to the nearest integer
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Analyzing data collected from various types of sources allows more accurate analysis results and
more insightful decision makings. In practices, these data usually come from different parties.
For instance, health information exchange networks (e.g., GaHIN [GaH, 2015], NHIN [NHI, 2015])
have been established for improving public health. The government needs to combine tax records
with education records to analyze the efficiency of educational investments by linking two and more
databases [XRo, 2018]. In addition, two satellite operators belonging to different nations (e.g., the US
and Russia) perform collision predictions by exchanging their satellite’s status. On the other hand,
third-party commercial cloud services such as Amazon Web Service, AliCloud and Azure provide
a flexible and economic way to perform data analysis on large scale data. According to a recent
survey [Microsoft, 2016], about one third of organizations and companies work with commercial
clouds.
On the opposite side, outsourcing data and computation to the commercial cloud might bring
potential risks to users’ personal information. For example, Facebook Leak and Heartland Payment
Systems (HPY) credit card breach leak out million of personal data and credit card records. These
leaks do harm to user’s privacy and lead to a great economic loss. Also, data that transferred and
stored in the third-party server is out of the user’s control. Users is forced to trust cloud service
providers not to spy on their private information, and must trust them not to take record even the
user want to delete the data. Potential risks of data privacy and control-less issues are becoming
the core concerns when using the commercial cloud services. Especially when the data is highly
sensitive and confidential, such as genomic data and federal records, it is difficult (even illegal) to
outsource data to an outside cloud. It is necessary to develop advanced techniques to protect the
confidentiality of data to enable secure analysis on the cloud environment.
2
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Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [Gentry, 2009] that allows to perform arithmetic opera-
tions above encrypted values directly is one of promising solution for the privacy issue on the cloud
environment. By using FHE, data and values can be encrypted before transferring to the cloud,
and all computation and evaluation by the cloud are performed over ciphertexts only. This gives
a powerful way to protect the privacy data on the cloud. For example, even the database on the
cloud is leaked or hacked, only the encrypted data are released. As long as the decryption key is
kept secret, the privacy and confidentiality of the leaked information is unscathed.
However, the two main difficulties of deploying FHE to cloud applications are the large compu-
tation overhead and communication overhead of FHE.
Large Computation Overhead. From the theoretical point, FHE allows to evaluate an arbitrary
Boolean circuit on encrypted data by using a plaintext space Z2, which requires to encrypt each bit
of the input data [Gentry et al., 2012a]. Nevertheless, [Gentry et al., 2012b] have shown that the
overhead of evaluating a Boolean gate on FHE ciphertexts is a polylog function aspect to the security
level, the practical running time of an FHE-based protocol could be too long to be practical. For
example, it might took more than 36 hours to evaluate the AES circuit (which is a small size circuit
consists of about 3.0 × 104 gates) on FHE ciphertexts [Gentry et al., 2012a]. Even the following
optimizations and programming improvements accelerated this AES performance to 7 minutes, the
bit-wise encryption manner seems too far from practical for daily applications such as statistical
analysis and machine learning which can consist of millions of Boolean gates. In other words, the
bit-wise encryption and Boolean circuit manner is so powerful that we can evaluate any functionality
on encrypted data, at the cost of a large computation and storage overhead. On the other hand,
to have a better performance, we can evaluate Arithmetic circuits instead of evaluating Boolean
circuits, i.e., using a prime field Zt for a prime t > 2. Many approaches belong to on this line such
as e.g., Wu and Haven [2012], Lauter et al. [2014a]. However, the efficiency of these approaches are
not convincing enough, e.g., it took Wu and Haven [2012] more than 400 minutes to compute the
linear regression from encrypted data with only 5 features.
Large Communication Overhead. When developing FHE protocols for the cloud applications,
the communication overhead might require more care than the computation overhead because it
is much more difficult for the cloud provider to extend its network bandwidth than adding more
machines [Pinkas et al., 2014]. However, most of the current FHE protocols does not take count
of the communication efficiency. For example, the method of Liu et al. [2017] aims to evaluate a
convolutional neural network over encrypted images, but this method needs to exchange more than
9 GB data just for one single 32× 32 pixels RGB image.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
1.2 Our Contributions
The existing FHE-based applications have their own performance issue. Some of them require too
much computing resources (e.g., thousands hours of computation) while some of them introduce a
large communication overhead. These issues are not specified to the applications described but also
to many other approaches that use FHE. It is commonly thought by the community that FHE is too
expensive to use, e.g., requiring many hours to evaluate circuits with a few hundreds of (Boolean or
Arithmetic) gates. However, in this dissertation, we will show that FHE protocols with a reasonably
small computation overhead and communication overhead are possible as long as we use appropriate
message packings (described in the following chapters).
More specifically, we focus on the functionality of inner product of vectors. The inner product
functionality can be represented by an Arithmetic circuit. More importantly, it is the fundamental
operation of many statistical computations, such as statistic tests, descriptive statistics, predictive
statistics and machine learning. In other words, if we want to develop a practical application for
such statistical computations using FHE, communication and computation efficient FHE protocols
for the inner product functionality are necessary.
In this dissertation, we present three FHE-based primitives, i.e., ΠIP (§ 3), ΠMP (§ 4) and ΠSMP
(§ 5), via existing and newly proposed packing techniques. These primitives are delicately designed
for computing inner products of encrypted values, but with a different requirement. Using ΠIP, we
can compute a single inner product of long vectors in a very efficient way. On the hand, ΠMP enables
us to compute iterative inner products from multiple vectors, with a larger computation overhead
compared with ΠIP. For example, products of K matrices (i.e, K > 2) can be reduced to iterative
inner products. In addition, for applications that require a smaller communication overhead, we
present the third primitive ΠSMP, which is also friendly for a weak decryptor. ΠSMP is useful for
client–server applications, in which the network bandwidth is very limited and the client’s computing
power is usually much weaker than the server.
Moreover, using the proposed three primitives, we present three concrete applications of using
FHE on the cloud. In particular, we deal with three different ways of using the cloud which can
cover many real applications; that is cloud-aid data sharing, outsourcing computation and cloud-
based online service. Cloud-aid data sharing is used when two weak clients want to cooperate
together by vertically joining their data. Because the clients are not powerful enough to conduct
the computation, they want to use the computing resources of the cloud. On the other hand,
outsourcing computation involves more than two participants, and thus is more more general than
the cloud-aid data sharing setting. We can use traditional secure multi-party (MPC) solutions but
they are less practical because MPC solutions need a quadratic number of communications between
the participants [Couteau, 2018] . On the other hand, by collecting participants’ data to a center
server, we can eliminate the communications between the participants. For the third setting, the
cloud-based online service runs between a client and a web server (e.g., AliCloud’s face recognition
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service), leading two kinds of privacy to be considered. One is the client’s data privacy (e.g., the
client’s facial information). The other is the web server’s privacy (e.g., the parameters of the classifier
of face recognition).
Our contributions include designing and developing efficient protocols for secure computing on
untrusted cloud servers via fully homomorphic encryption. In this thesis, we will show four specific
protocols for the three settings introduced above.
• For the cloud-aid data sharing setting, we present an efficient FHE-based protocol to conduct
Hardy–Weinberg Equilibrium test and Linkage Equilibrium. More specifically, we consider
two participants who provide genomic and clinical data, respectively. Our approach is about
2000× faster than the previous solution [Lauter et al., 2014a].
• For the outsourcing computation setting, we present a framework that equipped with three
kinds of encodings and three fundamental building blocks for securely outsourcing a various
types of statistical analysis over numerical, categorical and ordinal data. Moreover, we present
a protocol to privately outsource the decision tree evaluation to the cloud, which is the first
construction of outsourcing such functionality privately, to the best of our knowledge.
• For the cloud-based online service setting, we present a communication efficient secure ma-
trix multiplication protocol. This protocol enables us to conduct privacy-preserving machine
learning (PPML) evaluation in a much more efficient manner. For instance, our matrix multi-
plication protocol can reduce more than 90% computation time and communication overhead
over the state-of-the-art PPML approaches [Liu et al., 2017, Mohassel and Zhang, 2017].
Chapter 2
Cryptographic Preliminaries
In this chapter, we review some background of cryptographic primitives and privacy-preserving
computation under the simulation-based paradigm [Goldreich, 2009].
2.1 (Decision) Ring Learning with Errors
The security of the homomorphic encryption we used is based on the famous Ring Learning with
Errors (RLWE) problem [Lyubashevsky et al., 2010]. We give a definition of the decision-RLWE
problem here.
Definition 1. Let N be a power of 2. Let A = Z[X]/(XN + 1), and At = A/tA for some prime
integer t. Let s be a random element in At, and let χe be a distribution over At obtained by sampling
each coefficient of the polynomial from a discrete Gaussian distribution over Z. We write As,χe to
denote the distribution obtained by sampling a U←− At uniformly at random, choosing e χe←− At, and
outputting (a · s + e, a). Decision-RLWE is the problem of distinguishing between the distribution
As,χe and the uniform distribution on A2t .
According to [Lyubashevsky et al., 2010], for certain parameters (e.g., N, t, standard deviation
of χe, and the distribution of s), the decision-RLWE problem is as hard as solving a certain famous
lattice problem (i.e., shortest vector problem) in the worst case.
2.2 BGV’s Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
In our research, we use fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) as one of the building blocks. Specifi-
cally, we apply BGV’s homomorphic encryption scheme [Brakerski et al., 2012] due to the publicly
available implementation, i.e., HElib [Halevi and Shoup, 2017]. We give some details of the BGV’s
scheme.
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2.2.1 Distributions
Three distributions are involved in the construction of the BGV’s encryption scheme.
• For a real value σ > 0, χe denotes a distribution over ZN which picks its elements independently
from the discrete zero-mean Gaussian distribution of variance σ2. Due to the security concerns,
σ is normally chosen as 3.2 [Chen et al., 2017].
• HWT denotes the uniform distribution over the set {−1, 0, 1}N whose Hamming weight is
exactly 64.
• ZO is the distribution over the set {−1, 0, 1}N which draws ±1 with probability of 0.25, and
draws 0 with probability of 0.5.
Also, we write U to indicate the uniform distribution. For example, a U←− Zt is sampling uniformly
at random from Zt.
2.2.2 BGV’s Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
The BGV scheme is defined over polynomial rings of the form A = Z[X]/(XN + 1) where N is a
power of 2. The plaintext space for the scheme the ring is At := A/tA, namely polynomials modulo
XN + 1 and a prime t.
The ciphertext space for this scheme consists of vectors over Aq = A/qA, where q is an odd mod-
ulus that evolves along with the homomorphic evaluation. Specifically, the scheme is parameterized
by a chain of moduli, q0 < q1 < · · · < qL, and a newly encrypted ciphertext is defined over AqL .
Along with homomorphic multiplication, we switch to smaller and smaller moduli before we get to
the last level, i.e., Aq0 . We designate ciphertexts that are defined over Aqi , “i-th level ciphertexts”.
These i-th level ciphertexts are size-2 vectors over Aqi , i.e., c = (c0, c1) ∈ A2qi .
BGV’s homomorphic encryption scheme consists of five algorithms, i.e., KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Add
and Mult. We now review these algorithms.
KeyGen: Three keys are generated. The secret key is sampled according to the hamming weight
distribution sk := (1, s) where s HWT←− {−1, 0, 1}N . The public key is computed as pk = (t·e−a·
s, a) where e χe←− AqL and a U←− AqL . The evaluation key is computed as evk = (s2+t·e′−a′ ·s, a′)
where e′ and a′ follow the same distribution of e and a, respectively. Note that the arithmetic
operations here (i.e., ·,+ and −) are performed over the quotient space AqL .
Enc: Given the plaintext m ∈ At, the L-th level ciphertext is computed as
(c0, c1) := u · pk +˙ (m+ t · e1, e2) ∈ A2qL
where u ZO←− {−1, 0, 1}N and e1, e2 χe←− AqL .
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Dec: To decrypt a l-th level ciphertext (c0, c1) ∈ A2ql , we compute (c0 + c1 · s mod ql) mod t.
Add: Homomorphic addition of two l-th level ciphertexts c, c′ ∈ A2qi , are simply adding the compo-
nents, i.e., (c0 + c
′
0, c1 + c
′
1). We designate the operator ⊕ as the homomorphic addition.
Mult: Homomorphic multiplication of two l-th level ciphertexts c, c′ ∈ A2qi are more complicated than
the homomorphic addition. We first compute three values (d0, d1, d2) = (c0 ·c′0, c0 ·c′1 +c1 ·c′0, c1 ·
c′1). Then, we need the evaluation key evk and compute (d
′
0, d
′
1) = (d0, d1) +˙ d2 ◦ evk. Finally,
we rescale them and convert the level-l ciphertext to the next level (d 1t c · d′0, d 1t c · d′1) ∈ A2ql−1
via the modulus-switching [Brakerski et al., 2012]. In other words, the BGV’s scheme supports
maximally a multiplicative depth of L. Even though, with the bootstrapping technique [Halevi
and Shoup, 2015], we can evaluate any depth of multiplicative circuit. However, current
bootstrapping techniques are still too expensive to use. For most of the applications, the
maximum depth L must be decided in advance. We also designate the operator ⊗ as the
homomorphic multiplication operation.
2.3 Existing Packings
To make homomorphic encryption more practical and useful, one of the most important methodology
is applying an appropriate packing for the task at hand. Recall that the plaintext element in
the BGV’s scheme are polynomials in At, and homomorphic operations on encrypted values are
transferred in the plaintext space as corresponding operations (i.e,. multiplication and addition)
in the ring At. On the other hand, the user of homomorphic encryption would instead want to
operate computation on integers (real numbers). Packing methods are responsible for converting
these integers (real numbers) inputs to elements of At, and after the homomorphic operations, the
packing methods convert the computed results back to the integer (real number) domain.
There are three packing methods [Chen et al., 2017, Yasuda et al., 2013, Smart and Vercauteren,
2014] that encode information into the coefficients of polynomials.
2.3.1 Packing A Single Integer
Suppose that (adad−1 · · · a0)B is the B-radix representation of an integer a ∈ Z, that is a =
∑d
i=0 ai ·
Bi. The integer packing piint simply packs the integer a as the polynomial
piint(a) = A = sign(a) ·
d∑
i=0
aiX
i.
As long as d < N and B < t, we can see that A ∈ At.
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2.3.2 Packing A Single Floating Point Value
The floating point value is given by an integer part and a fractional party, e.g., 5.875 = 5 + 0.875.
Formally, a floating point value b ∈ R can be written as
b =
d∑
i=0
bi · 2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
integer part
+
d′∑
j=1
b′j · 2−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
fractional part
for bi, b
′
j ∈ {0, 1}. The fractional packing works as
pifrac(b) = B :=
d∑
i=0
biX
i +
d′∑
j=1
−b′jXN−j .
As long as d+ d′ ≤ N , then B ∈ At.
The plaintext space of the FHE can only handle at most log2 t bits of precision. A larger t
introduces more noise than a smaller one during the homomorphic operations. As a result, when a
large t is used, we might need to set a large N to prevent decryption failure. On the other hand,
the integer packing piint and fractional packing pifrac enable us to handle values with more than log2 t
bits of precision. For example, piint allows to encrypt integer in the range of [0, t
N ), which is about
N log2 t bits of precision. Thereby, we can use a relatively smaller (and thus faster) parameter N
for the FHE scheme.
2.3.3 Forward Backward Packing
The technique of Yasuda et al. [2013] and Lu et al. [2015] enables efficient private evaluation of inner
products. We give a generalization of this technique. Let u,v ∈ ZNt be vectors of integers. We
introduce two functions pifwd and pibwd that convert a vector of integers to a polynomial:
pifwd(u) =
N−1∑
i=0
u[i] ·Xi, pibwd(v) =
N−1∑
j=0
v[j] ·XN−1−j . (2.1)
Let α be a scalar. We have the following properties.
pifwd(u) + pifwd(v) = pifwd(u+ v) α · pifwd(u) = pifwd(α · u)
pibwd(u) + pibwd(v) = pibwd(u+ v) α · pibwd(v) = pibwd(α · v).
In other words, we can operate the vector addition and the vector-scalar multiplication with pifwd
and pibwd.
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2.3.4 Chinese Remainder Theorem Packing
Aside from the forward backward packing, the CRT-packing presented in [Smart and Vercauteren,
2014] is another technique commonly used for developing efficient FHE-based protocols. CRT-
packing leverages the polynomial Chinese Remainder Theorem (i.e., CRT) to convert a polynomial
vector to an element of At.
The plaintext space of the BGV scheme are elements of At := Zt[X]/(XN+1), and the polynomial
XN + 1 factors prime t into ` irreducible factors, {Fj(X)}j
XN + 1 = F1(X) · F2(X) · · ·F`(X) (modt),
where all the factors of degree d = N/`. For the purpose of packing, we view a polynomial A ∈ At
not as polynomial of modulus t but as a polynomial over the extension field Ftd . The plaintext
values that encoded in A are its evaluations at ` (specific) primitive 2N -th roots of unity in Ftd .
In literature, factors {Fj(X)} are called plaintext slots. We write picrt : (Ftd)` → At to denote
the CRT-packing function, and write pi−1crt as the reversing function.
The most important property of this packing is element-wise operations. Let p and q be two
length-` vectors of polynomials, where p[j], q[j] ∈ Zt[X]. The element-wise polynomial addition and
multiplication are given as
picrt(p) + picrt(q) = picrt(p +˙ q) (2.2)
picrt(p)× picrt(q) = picrt(p ◦ q).
Beside the element-wise operation, the CRT-packing also enables “slot-movement”. As noted
in [Gentry et al., 2012b], for each slot index i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , `} there is a mappingMk parameterized
by k ∈ Z∗2N ,Mk : A(X) 7→ A(Xk) mod (XN +1), which will exchange the element in i-th slot with
the element in the j-th slot. By multiplying binary masking vectors, we can achieve cyclic rotation
on the ciphertexts of CRT-packed vectors. It is noteworthy that the mapping Mk changes the
decryption key. Suppose the ciphertext c’s decryption key is sk := (1, s). Then, after the application
of Mk on c, the corresponding decryption key becomes sk′ := (1,Mk(s)). Thereby, during the key
generation procedure, we need to generate some “key-switching” keys Mk(s)→ s.
2.4 Security Model
Our protocols are private under the semi-honest assumption. That is the protocol players follow
the protocol specification, but might want to learn extra information during the protocol execution.
Our security definitions follow the real world/ideal world paradigm of [Canetti, 2000, Goldreich,
2009]. Specifically, we compare the protocol execution in the real world to an execution in an ideal
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world. In the real world, protocol players follow the specification of a protocol Π, and in the ideal
world, protocol players have access to a trusted third party (TTP) that evaluates the functionality.
The protocol execution is viewed as occurring in the existence of an adversary A and cooperated
with an environment C = {Cκ} which is modeled as a class of polynomial-size circuits parameterized
by a security parameter κ. The role of the environment is to choose the input to the protocol
execution and to distinguish experiments in the real world and the ideal world. We use the notation
of privacy [Ishai et al., 2011].
Definition 2. Let F : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}∗ be a deterministic functionality, and Fb(x1, x2)
denote the b-th element of F(x1, x2). Let Π be a two-party protocol for implementing F . The view
of the b-th party (i.e., b ∈ {1, 2}) during an execution of Π on (x1, x2), written as VΠb (x1, x2), is
(xb, r,m1, · · · ,mT ), where r denotes the random coin of the b-th party, and mi represents the i-th
message it has received.
Protocol Π is said to privately implement the functionality F(x, y) in the semi-honest model if
there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, denoted S1 and S2, such that
{S1(x1,F1(x1, x2))}x1,x2∈{0,1}∗ ≈c {VΠ1 (x1, x2)}x1,x2∈{0,1}∗
{S2(x2,F2(x1, x2))}x1,x2∈{0,1}∗ ≈c {VΠ2 (x1, x2)}x1,x2∈{0,1}∗ ,
where ≈c denotes computational indistinguishability by classes of polynomial-size circuits.
Informally, a protocol Π privately implements a functionality F if for any polynomial-size circuit,
it can not distinguish between the real and ideal world executions.
Chapter 3
Efficient Inner Product of
Encrypted Long Vectors
The inner product of vectors is a basic and important computation. For example, the studies of
the independence between human genome and disease (e.g., χ2 statistic tests) involve inner prod-
uct of long vectors. Also, descriptive statistics such as Fisher discriminant analysis and principal
component analysis use inner products. In the context of the secure computation, we can get a
direct method of computing inner products using FHE, since what we need to evaluate the inner
product are just additions and multiplications. Indeed, the FHE inner product method from Lauter
et al. [2014a] is a such direct method, i.e., encrypting the entries of the vectors separately and ap-
plying the multiply-then-add computation to achieve the FHE inner product. Thus the complexity
of their method is O(d) aspect to the vector size of d. However, their method would take a long
computation time when long vectors are involved. For instance, in genome-wide association studies
(GWAS), e.g., Linkage Disequilibrium and Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium, the vector size equals to
the number of patients (or objects), and thus d would be a few thousands [Bos et al., 2014a]. From
the experiments in the following section, we will show that Lauter et al. [2014a]’s approach might
take days to conduct such genome-wide association studies.
To overcome the high computation overhead of computing inner product of long vectors, in
this chapter, we present to pre-preocess the long vectors into polynomials before encryption by
expoliting the algebra struture of the plaintext space At. As a result, we reduce the complexity
of computing the inner product from O(d) to O(d/N) where N is usually set as N > 4000, which
leads to a significant speed up comparing to the previous method. In addition, as the application,
we present an FHE protocol for two common genome-wide association studies, i.e., χ2 test for
independence and Linkage Disequilibrium. The basic strategy is to compute allelic frequency tables
and genotype frequency tables privately from encrypted genetic data (i.e., in the form of vectors).
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Protocol ΠIP
Input from encryptor: Vector u ∈ Zdt .
Input from evaluator: Vector v ∈ Zdt .
Output of decryptor: Inner product 〈u,v〉 mod t. Protocol:
Encryptor:
1. Encryptor partitions u into N -sized blocks, i.e., u = u1‖u2‖· · · ‖ud′ where d′ = dd/Ne. (The
last block might be less than N elements). Encryptor processes each block with the forward
packing and then apply encryption. Then encryptor sends the ciphertexts {Enc (pifwd(ui))}d′i=1 to
evaluator.
Evaluator:
2. Similarly, evaluator also partitions v into N -sized blocks, v = v1‖v2‖· · · ‖vd′ . However, evaluator
processes those blocks with the backward packing obtain ciphertexts {Enc (pibwd(vi))}d′i=1.
3. Evaluator computes and sends the ciphertext cfinal to decryptor
R⊕(
d′⊕
i=1
Enc (pifwd(ui))⊗Enc (pibwd(vi))) where R U←− At except that the N -th coeff. R[N−1] = 0.
Decrytpor:
4. Decrytpor decrypts cfinal to R
′ and outputs the N -th coefficient, i.e. R′[N − 1].
Figure 3.1: Inner Product Protocol of Encrypted Vectors
With these tables, GWAS-related statistics including D′ measure of Linkage Disequilibrium, the
Pearson Goodness-of-Fit, HWT, and the χ2 test can be conducted. We defer the details of these
studies in the following subsection. The experimental results show that using our efficient inner
product, these two GWAS computations can be 4000× faster than that uses the inner product of
Lauter et al. [2014a].
3.1 Efficient Inner Product of Encrypted Long Vectors
We now present our FHE inner product ΠIP in Figure 3.1. The protocol ΠIP takes as input of
ciphertexts of two length-d vectors u,v ∈ Zdt , and outputs the ciphertext of their inner product
〈u,v〉 mod t.
Theorem 1. Protocol ΠIP of Figure 3.1 privately implements the inner product functionality, i.e.,
〈u,v〉 mod t.
Proof (Correctness). The vectors u and v are partitioned into blocks of the same size. We directly
have 〈u,v〉 = ∑i 〈ui,ui〉. For the correctness, it suffices to prove that Enc (pifwd(ui))⊗Enc (pibwd(vi))
gives the ciphertext of 〈ui,ui〉 because the summation can be performed by homomorphic additions.
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Table 3.1: Timing of fully homomorphic scheme with parameters N = 8192, t = 640007, L = 6.
Operation Encrypt Mult Add Add with Plaintext
Time (ms) 3.08 7.57 0.032 0.789
From the construction of the forward-backward packing, the N -th coefficient of the resulting
polynomial pifwd(ui)× pibwd(vi) is
∑N−1
j=0 ui[j] · vi[j] which is exactly the inner product 〈ui,vi〉.
Proof (Privacy). The privacy against semi-hones encryptor and evaluator is directly given by the
semantic security of the underlying homomorphic encryption since encryptor and evaluator can only
see encrypted values.
On the other hand, the view of decryptor consists of the polynomial R′. The coefficients of
R′, except the N -th coefficient, are distributed uniformly at random over Zt due to the random
polynomial R in Step 3. Thereby, we can simply construct a simulator to simulate the view of
decryptor by sampling a uniform random polynomial from At.
Complexity and Parameter Selection. The computation complexity of the evaluator in ΠIP
is O(d/N) where d is the size of vectors and N is one of the FHE parameter. Also, according to
the security analysis of Gentry et al. [2012a], we need to set N ≥ 8192 to achieve at least 128-bit
security level. In other words, we can conduct the inner product of vectors with more than 8000
entries via just a single homomorphic multiplication, which is a significant boost comparing to the
naive solution (see the next subsection).
Limitation. The N -th coefficient of the resulting polynomial pifwd(ui) × pibwd(vi) does give the
inner product of ui and vi. On the other hand, the other N − 1 coefficients are randomized, and
thus we barely re-use these N − 1 coefficients in any further computation. These N − 1 randomized
coefficients are considered as noisy terms.
3.1.1 Comparison to the Naive (non-packing) Approach
Table 3.1 summarizes the computing time of each homomorphic operation under a specific FHE
parameter. By using an appropriate packing, we can see that the inner product of two encrypted
vectors can be much more efficient than the naive non-packing approach, according to the numbers
of Table 3.1. For example, the naive unpacking method to compute the inner product of vectors of
length 8192 would need 8192 homomorphic multiplications and additions, which would take about 62
seconds. On the other hand, using the forward packing packing, it would only take one homomorphic
multiplication and addition, and thus taking less than 8.0 ms, to compute the inner product of 8192
elements. It is more than a 8000× boost under this FHE parameter.
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Figure 3.2: Joining encrypted genotype and phenotype data cross multiple data contributors.
3.2 Application: Secure Genome-wide Association Studies
on Cloud
The proposed protocol ΠIP can be used in many cloud-aid computation scenario. As an example,
we give an application of privacy-preserving χ2 statistic test and linkage disequilibrium (LD) in-
dependence test, which are two commonly used statistics in genome-wide association studies. By
using our inner product protocol, we can efficiently compute χ2 and LD from a large (encrypted)
genomic and clinical data on the cloud. Empirical results show that, our approach is about 2000×
faster than the previous cryptographic solution [Lauter et al., 2014b]. In this section, we give an
application of ΠIP: secure genome-wide association studies (GWAS). More specifically, we target on
two commonly used statistical tests, i.e., χ2 test and linkage disequilibrium test.
Because of recent advances in DNA sequencing technologies, the cost of DNA sequencers is
dropping rapidly. As a result, the scale of genomic data used by researchers is becoming larger
and larger. To conduct computations on a large-scale genomic dataset, a cloud server that provides
computational resources at low cost is regarded as a promising option. Genomic and clinical data
are highly sensitive. Outsourcing these data to an external server raises concerns about the privacy
of sensitive data. Consequently, for outsourcing of computation with genomic data, privacy should
be rigorously preserved.
Related Work. FHE has been used to protect to genomic and clinical data in the cloud. Bos et al.
[2014b] proposed a working implementation of cloud service for private computation of encrypted
health data using FHE. Lauter et al. [2014a] demonstrated an approach to conducting private com-
putation using encrypted genomic data with FHE (Figure 3.2). Unfortunately, these cryptographic
solutions are not sufficiently time and space efficient to conduct a GWAS-scale computation, which
can involve about 3× 106 SNPs for thousands or more subjects.
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Our contribution includes a much more efficient cryptographic protocol for χ2 and linkage dise-
quilibrium test. Empirical results show that, our approach is about 2000× faster than the previous
cryptographic solution [Lauter et al., 2014b].
3.2.1 Problem Statements: χ2 Test and Linkage Disequilibrium Test
Table 3.2: Examples of raw genome data and raw phenotype data.
(a) Raw genome data Dg
ID Genomic Data
1 CC CG CT GG AA
2 AG CT CT AG CT
3 CT GG CC AG AA
4 AA GG GG AG CC
(b) Raw phenotype data Dp
ID′ Disease Status
1 Case
2 Control
3 Control
4 Case
Our basic strategy is to compute allelic frequency tables and genotype frequency tables privately
from encrypted genetic data. With these tables, GWAS-related statistics including D′ measure of
LD, the Pearson Goodness-of-Fit, HWE, and the χ2 test are conducted. In this work particularly,
we apply our method to the χ2 test and LD to demonstrate the effectiveness of our protocol.
We review an allelic frequency table and a genotype frequency table with two markers. Table 3.2a
gives a view of a genomic dataset Dg. Each record contains an explicit identifier ID and SNPs.
Similarly, Table 3.2b gives a view of a phenotype dataset Dp. Each record contains an explicit
identifier ID′ to identify each subject and an attribute to indicate the disease status of the subject.
Presuming that M subjects and N SNPs are involved, then the dataset Dg contains N rows, with
each row containing M data points; the dataset Dp includes M rows.
Table 3.3: Observed allele frequency in a case–control study of M subjects.
Allele Type total
A a
case o1 o2 N1
control o3 o4 N2
total N ′1 N
′
2 2M
Presuming that A, a are possible alleles. An allelic frequency table (Table 3.3) consists of 2× 2
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Table 3.4: Genotype frequencies at markers M1 and M2 of M subjects.
Marker M1
Total
AA Aa aa
Marker M2
BB o11 o12 o13 N1
Bb o21 o22 o23 N2
bb o31 o32 o33 N3
Total N ′1 N
′
2 N
′
3 2M
counts
o1 = 2N
case
AA +N
case
Aa o2 = 2N
case
aa +N
case
Aa
o3 = 2N
control
AA +N
control
Aa o4 = 2N
control
aa +N
control
Aa ,
where N caseAA and N
case
Aa are the observed population counts for genotype AA and Aa in the case
group: N controlAA and N
control
Aa are the observed counts for the control group.
The χ2 test for the additive model is equivalent to the χ2 test based on Table 3.3. The one
degree of freedom (d.f.) test statistic is written as
χ2a =
2M(o2(o3 + o4)− o4(o1 + o2))2
N1N2N ′1N
′
2
.
In addition to a χ2 test, we can evaluate the Hardy–Weinberg Equilibrium directly from an allelic
frequency table similarly.
Given alleles (A/a and B/b) at two markers, a genotype frequency table (Table 3.4) with two
markers is obtained that consists of 3× 3 counts
o11 = NAABB o12 = NAaBB o13 = NaaBB
o21 = NAABb o22 = NAaBb o23 = NaaBb
o31 = NAAbb o32 = NAabb o33 = Naabb.
The value Nii′jj′ denotes the observed population counts for genotype ii
′ and jj′ where i, i′ ∈ {A, a},
and j, j′ ∈ {B, b}.
We evaluate LD from Table 3.4. The linkage disequilibrium is calculated as D = Pr(AB) −
Pr(A) Pr(B), where probabilities Pr(AB), Pr(A) and Pr(B) are computed, respectively, as (2o11 +
o12 +o21)/2M , (2N
′
1 +N
′
2−o22)/2M and (2N1 +N2−o22)/2M . We omit the frequency o22 to avoid
the problem of haplotype ambiguity, especially when only genotypes are measured. See [Ziegler and
Ko¨nig, 2010] for more details.
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We remark that several measures for measuring linkage disequilibrium were proposed, including
Pearson’s correlation, Lewontin’s D′, frequency difference and Yule’s Q. Our proposal works for all
these measures. However, we applied our method to Lewontin’s D′ measure in the experimentation
because of space limitations. Additional details related to these measurements are explained in an
earlier report of the literature [Ziegler and Ko¨nig, 2010].
3.2.2 Data Encoding
Let A and a be the alleles of the biallelic locus. Consequently, the genomic data at the locus is either
AA,Aa, or aa. We represent each row of the genomic dataset Dg as two integer vectors xAA,xAa.
Here, xAA[i], the i-th element of xAA, represents the frequency of genotype AA at the marker locus:
xAA[i] = 2 for AA and xAA[i] = 0 for other genotypes. xAa[i] is similar to xAA[i] except that
xAa[i] = 1 for Aa.
We presume that the disease status of each subject is represented by a binary variable, then
“disease” is represented by 1 (case); “non-disease” is represented by 0 (control). The phenotype
dataset Dp for all subjects is therefore represented by a binary vector ycase.
Presume in addition to the following that dataset Dg consists of N SNPs with M subjects. Q
data contributors are involved in the procedure. Therefore, they separately hold the phenotype
vector ycase and 2N genotype vectors xAA(i) and x
Aa
(i) , where (i) is the ID of the genotype data. Let
pi : {0, 1, 2}M × {1, 2, · · · , Q} 7→ {0, 1, 2}M be an assignment function that represents the partition
of genotype/phenotype held by the q-th data contributor. For example, the vertical partition of a
vector x for the q-th data contributor is represented as shown below.
pi(x, q)[j] =
x[j] if q-th data contributor holds the j-th element of x0 o.w. .
We assume that each element of vectors is contributed from only one data contributor, i.e.
∑
q pi(x, q)[j] =
x[j] holds for every j.
3.2.3 Evaluate the Allelic Frequency Table
With the encoding described, we evaluate Table 3.3 through scalar products of the representing
vectors. More specifically, frequencies o1, N
′
2, and N1 in Table 3.3 are evaluated respectively through
three scalar products as
o1 =
〈
xAA + xAa,ycase
〉
, N ′1 =
〈
xAA + xAa,1
〉
, N1 = 〈ycase,1〉 ,
where 1 is a vector of which the elements are 1. Because Table 3.3 is freedom-1 and the number of
objects M is assumed to be known,
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3.2.4 Evaluate the Genotype Frequency Table
Similarly, we compute the genotype frequency table described by Table 3.4 with two markers by
scalar products of the represented vectors as well. In particular, to calculate a D′-measure for the
LD, the following six scalar products are needed.
4 · o11 =
〈
xAA,xBB
〉
, 2 · o12 =
〈
xAa,xBB
〉
,
2 · o21 =
〈
xAA,xBb
〉
, o22 =
〈
xAa,xBb
〉
,
2N ′1 +N
′
2 =
〈
xAA + xAa,1
〉
, 2N1 +N2 =
〈
xBB + xBb,1
〉
.
3.2.5 Full Protocol
The procedure of secure outsourcing χ2 and LD to the cloud is shown in Figure 3.4. Recall that
the evaluation of scalar product requires a forward-packed vector and a backward-packed vector.
Consequently, at Step 1 and Step 2, data contributors upload four copies for one genotype data in
the form of the forward-packed and backward-packed vectors. The cloud aggregates the collected
ciphertexts at Step 3, which only involves homomorphic additions. Then the cloud computes the
allelic frequency table and the genotype frequency table respectively at Step 4 and Step 5.
The correctness of Figure 3.4 is directly given by the description in § 3.2.3 and § 3.2.4. Moreover,
the privacy of Figure 3.4 can be reduced trivially to the privacy of our inner product protocol
of Figure 3.1. Intuitively, the view of the cloud during the protocol execution of Figure 3.4 consists
of only ciphertexts. Thus, we omit the form security proof of Figure 3.4.
3.2.6 Evaluations
We benchmarked the computational costs of our method and compared it with a method proposed by
Lauter et al. [2014a], in which a genetic data point and a clinical data point are encoded respectively
into three bits and two bits. All experiments were conducted on computers with a 2.60 GHz CPU
(Xeon; Intel Corp.) and 32 GB RAM. We measured the computation time separately for Step 1.1
and 1.2 as the preparation time and for Steps 3.1 and 3.2 as the evaluation time. Details of the
experiment settings are presented following. 1) An artificial dataset includes 1.0 × 104 subjects.
2) Q = 5 data contributors are sharing same quantity of data points. 3) We used 8 threads for
computation in parallel. 4) Parameters of the encryption scheme were set as N = 8192, t = 640007,
and L = 6.
Performance of Homomorphic Encryption and Implementation Hints. The implemen-
tation of Lauter et al. was done on an algebraic computation system, i.e. Magma, whereas our
implementation was developed on native codes. To compare our method with their method fairly,
we measured the computation time of operations in HElib and re-estimated the computation time
method of Lauter et al. Table 3.1 shows the computation time of the operations of homomorphic
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(a) Benchmark for outsourcing χ2 test with 1.0×104 subjects. (b) Benchmark for outsourcing LD with 1.0× 104 subjects.
Figure 3.3: Comparison of the proposed secure outsourcing χ2 test and LD with Lauter et al. [2014a].
encryption scheme. Values are the mean of 1000 runs of each operation with 8-threads. We used
parameter N = 8192, which is not sufficiently large to conduct more than 8192 subjects. Indeed, we
partitioned vectors into smaller parts and encrypted each part as a ciphertext. In doing so, we were
able to conduct a large-scale dataset while maintaining smaller N . We remark that as the number
of the partition increases, more communication time must be used during the upload phase.
Evaluation Results: χ2 Test. We benchmarked our proposed protocol of evaluating χ2 test on an
artificial dataset that contains M = 1.0×104 subjects. The results are presented in Figure 3.3a. The
number of the total genotype data was varied from 1.0× 103 to 1.0× 106. Recalling that parameter
N = 8192, one can thereby maximally pack genotype/phenotype data of 8192 subjects into a single
ciphertext. Consequently, to conduct the experiment with 1.0×104 subjects, we partitioned a vector
into two parts having equal length. Figure 3.3a depicts the performance of our proposed method and
the estimated computation time of the method of Lauter et al. [2014a]. As shown in Figure 3.3a,
for evaluation of χ2 test statistics of 1.0 × 106 genotype data with M = 1.0 × 104 subjects, our
method took about 12 hours (about 43ms per test). Compared to the method of Lauter et al., the
evaluation is expected to cost more than 2000 days. Our proposal is therefore considerably efficient.
Evaluation Results: Linkage Disequilibrium. The benchmark of the evaluation of LD is
presented in Figure 3.3b. In this experiment, we considered a smaller synthesis data containing
1.0 × 103 genotype data of M = 1.0 × 104 subjects. The number of LD to be evaluated was about
5.0× 105 LDs in this experiment. With this settings, our method costs less than 11 hours (about 80
ms per LD). We consider that result as great increase in speed compared with the method of Lauter
et al. that might cost more than 2600 days to finish the evaluation in estimation.
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Protocol Full Protocol for Secure Outsourcing χ2 Test and LD Test.
Public known: All data contributor can access to the encryption key pk. The number of subjects M
is also publicly known.
Private inputs: The q-th data contributor has input its clinical data pi(ycase, q). For genotype data
with ID(i), the q-th data contributor hash input pi(xA(i), q) for A ∈ {AA,Aa, aa}. The analyst has input
the decryption key sk.
Outputs: The analyst obtains the χ2 statistics or LD.
Protocol:
1. Upload Phenotype Data: The q-th data contributor computes and sends ciphertext(s)
Enc (pibwd(pi(y
case, q)))
to the cloud.
2. Upload Genotype Data: For genotype data with ID(i), the q-th data contributor computes and
sends ciphertexts
Enc
(
pifwd(pi(x
A
(i), q))
)
Enc
(
pibwd(pi(x
A
(i), q))
)
for A ∈ {AA,Aa}.
3. Join: For genotype data with ID(i), the cloud joins the collected ciphertexts
eˆxA
(i)
:=
Q⊕
q=1
Enc
(
pifwd(pi(x
A
(i), q))
)
exA
(i)
:=
Q⊕
q=1
Enc
(
pibwd(pi(x
A
(i), q))
)
.
The cloud also joins the ciphertext of phenotype data as eycase := ⊕Qq=1Enc (pibwd(pi(ycase, q))) and
prepares two plain values: pifwd(1) and pibwd(1).
4. Evaluate χ2 Statistics: Frequency N1 in Table 3.3 is homomorphically computed as eN1 =
eycase ⊗ pifwd(1). For genotype data with ID(i), the cloud homomorphically compute sufficient
statistics in Table 3.3 as
eo1 = (eˆxAA
(i)
⊕ eˆxAa
(i)
)⊗ eycase eN′1 = (eˆxAA(i) ⊕ eˆxAa(i) )⊗ pibwd(1)
5.1. Evaluate LD: Given two genotype ID(i) and ID(j), the cloud computes six frequencies in Ta-
ble 3.4.
e4o11 = eˆxAA
(i)
⊗ exAA
(j)
e2o12 = eˆxAa
(i)
⊗ exAA
(j)
e2o21 = eˆxAA
(i)
⊗ exAa
(j)
eo22 = eˆxAa
(i)
⊗ exAa
(j)
e2N′1+N′2 = (exAA(i)
⊕ exAa
(i)
)⊗ pifwd(1)
e2N1+N2 = (exAA
(j)
⊕ exAa
(j)
)⊗ pifwd(1)
5.2. From these six frequencies, the cloud can further compute the necessary values for D′-measure.
ePr(A) := e2N′1+N2 − eo22 ePr(B) := e2N1+N2 − eo22
e2 Pr(AB) := e4o11 ⊕ e2o12 ⊕ e2o21
6. Query χ2 Test: The cloud answers the χ2 query from the analyst and sends ciphertexts eN1 ,
eo1 and eN′1 to the analyst. Then the analyst can reconstruct the allelic frequency table, i.e.,
Table 3.3.
7. Query LD: The cloud answers the LD query from the analyst and sends ciphertexts e2 Pr(AB),
ePr(A) and ePr(B) to the analyst. Then the analyst can reconstruct the allelic frequency table, i.e.,
Table 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Full Protocol for Secure Outsourcing χ2 Test and LD Test.
Chapter 4
Iterative Computation on
Encrypted Matrices
Given a matrix A, we can use the protocol ΠIP described in the previous chapter to compute
the multiplication A2 privately since the matrix multiplication can be reduced to inner products.
However, we can not use ΠIP for a higher degree, i.e., A
k for k > 2 due to the error terms introduced
by the forward backward packing. On the other hand, the functionality A 7→ Ak for k > 2 is a very
important operations for many applications such as statistical analysis (e.g., linear regression) and
machine learning (e.g. collaborative filtering). If each entry of the matrix is encrypted separately as
Wu and Haven [2012], it is trivial to perform the iterative multiplications on the encrypted matrices.
Obviously, the method of Wu and Haven [2012] requires O(d3) number of homomorphic operations
aspect to the matrix dimension d.
In this chapter, we present a protocol ΠMP to compute iterative multiplications of encrypted
matrices. The key point of our iterative matrix multiplication protocool is to use the CRT packing
in a layout consistent way. Take the row-major layout as the example, that is each row of the matrix
is separately CRT-packed. The method of Halevi and Shoup [2014] uses CRT packing, however, it
outputs the resulting matrix in a column-major layout. To perform iterative multiplications, time
comsuming layout adjustments are needed. On the other hand, our iterative matrix multiplication
protocol takes as input of row-majorly encrypted matrices, and outputs the resulting matrix in
the row-major layout directly without any further layout adjustment. Overall, our iterative matrix
multiplication protocol needs O(d3/`) homomorphic operations, which is ` times faster than the
baseline method of Wu and Haven [2012].
22
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4.1 Primitives: Homomorphic Rotation and Homomorphic
Replication
We leverage the CRT-packing with a well-tuned homomorphic rotation operation in ΠMP. In addition
to the element-wise addition and multiplication, the CRT-packing also supports manipulations of
encrypted vectors. Specifically, we can homomorphically rotate an encrypted vector and replicate
one element of an encrypted vector. Similarly, let Rotate : At × Z 7→ At be the rotation function.
pi−1crt (Rotate(picrt(x), k)) = u ∈ Z`t
∀1 ≤ j ≤ ` u[j] = x[j + k mod `].
In other words, we can homomorphically rotate the encryted vector by the offset of k.
Also, from the rotation operation, we can derive a replicate operation Replicate : At × Z 7→ At
directly using O(log `) rotations.
pi−1crt (Replicate(picrt(x), k)) = v ∈ Z`t,
∀1 ≤ j ≤ ` v[j] = x[k].
That is, we can pick a specific element (i.e., the k-th entry) from the encryted vector, and homo-
morphically propagate it to the other positions.
4.2 Proposal: Iterative Multiplication of Encrypted Matri-
ces
In this work, we consider the row-major order in which rows of the matrix are encrypted separately.
It is natural to apply this layout in real applications. For instance, some research agents might
independently hold data with a different size but following the same data schema. Recall that
we apply the CRT-packing to each row of matrices and then encrypt each row Thereby, we write
{Enc (picrt(A[i, :]))}di=1 and {Enc (picrt(B[i, :]))}di=1 to denote the ciphertexts of each row of A,B ∈
Zd×dt , respectively. The ciphertext of a vector u ∈ Zdt is written as Enc (picrt(u)).
Now, we present our iterative matrix multiplication protocol ΠMP in Figure 4.1.. To keep the
layout consistent, we use the Replicate function. The following example demonstrates the idea
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Protocol ΠMP
Inputs: Ciphertext of the matrix A ∈ Z`×`t , i.e., {Enc (picrt(A[i, :]))}i for 1 ≤ i ≤ `. The exponent
k > 1.
Outputs: Ciphertext of the matrix exponent Ak, i.e.,
{
Enc
(
picrt(A
k[i, :])
)}
i
.
Protocol:
1. We replicate the slots of each row ciphertexts of A and obtain `2 ciphertexts, i.e.,
ai,j = Replicate(Enc (picrt(A[i, :])) , j) for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ `.
2. Let designate c
(1)
i := Enc (picrt(A[i, :])) for 1 ≤ i ≤ `.
3. Iterate in range 2 ≤ k′ ≤ k and compute
c
(k′)
i =
⊕`
j=1
(
c
(k′−1)
i ⊗ aj,i
)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ `.
4. Output ` ciphertexts {c(k)i }`i=1 which decrypts to Ak[i, :], respectively.
Figure 4.1: Iterative Matrix Multiplication of Encrypted Matrices.
behinds ΠMP.
[
[1, 2]
[3, 4]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
·
[
[e, f ]
[g, h]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
=

j=1︷ ︸︸ ︷
[1, 1] ◦ [e, f ] +˙ [2, 2] ◦ [g, h]
[3, 3] ◦ [e, f ] +˙ [4, 4] ◦ [g, h]︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=2
 .
Basically, we replicate each element of the left-hand-side matrix A and perform the element-wise
additions and multiplications. The resulting matrix is also in the row-major layout.
Theorem 2. (Correctness.) The protocol of Figure 4.1 correctly implements the functionality of
iterative matrix multiplication, i.e., Ak.
Proof. We prove via mathematical induction. It is clear that for k = 1, Figure 4.1 works correctly.
Suppose that c
(k′)
i decrypts to the i-th row of A
k′ . We prove that c
(k′+1)
i decrypts to the i-th row
of Ak
′+1. The ciphertext ai,j in Step 1 of Figure 4.1 decrypts to the (i, j) entry of A. Thereby, the
Step 3 is homomorphically computing
∑
jA
k′ [i, :]·A[j, i], which is exactly the i-th row of Ak′+1.
Matrix–vector Multiplication. Halevi and Shoup [2014] introduced a general procedure for the
matrix–vector multiplication. For the row-major layout, their procedure requires to “sum up” all
the slots of the CRT-packing, which might be expensive than the replication operation regarding
computational time. However, we give a different routine according to the observation that we only
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involve symmetric matrices in the matrix–vector multiplication (i.e., PCA). We thus can conduct
the matrix–vector multiplication Au as follows
d⊕
i=1
Enc (A[i, :])⊗ Replicate(Enc (u) , i). (4.1)
Notice that, this results at a ciphertext of CRT packed vector. Thereby, this matrix–vector multi-
plication can be used to compute iterative multiplications.
The security analysis of Figure 4.1 is deferred to the last section of this chapter.
4.3 Proposal: Batch Greater-than
We describe the batch greater-than protocol in Figure 4.2 which are used in the next application
section. Given integers 0 ≤ a, b < D for some positive D, we know that a > b if and only if
∃1 ≤ w < D such that a − b − w = 0. Thereby, we can construct a straw-man protocol by
homomorphically computing (a − b − w) · r for all w where the random value r is used to hide
|a− b|. This straw-man protocol, thus, requires O(D) homomorphic operations and generates O(D)
ciphertexts. We can reduce the computational cost and the number of ciphertexts of the straw-man
protocol by using the CRT-packing. Recall that the CRT-packing enables us to pack ` integers into
one ciphertext and the homomorphic addition and multiplication are then carried out on these `
integers simultaneously. Thereby, we can compute (a − b − w) · r with ` different w by viewing
these w as a vector w and using the picrt function. Moreover, we need to shuﬄe the positions of
each w before packing them since |a − b| will be revealed if the position of w is predictable. This
greater-than method, thus, requires O(dD/`e) homomorphic operations and generates O(dD/`e)
ciphertexts which is a considerable improvement for a large `.
Theorem 3. (Correctness.) The protocol of Figure 4.2 correctly implements the batch greater than
functionality I{ai > bi} for 1 ≤ i ≤ θ under the semi-honest setting.
We usually use the bGT only in the last step of a larger protocol since we need to decrypt the
output of bGT to obtain the comparison result. However, exceptions do exist when we can take
advantage of the randomness of the output of bGT. For instance, in the next section, we use the
bGT as an intermediate step to obliviously zero-out some rare values in a contingency table.
Summary of Complexity. The complexity of the proposed primitives and basic routines are
summarized in Table 4.1. We count the number of homomorphic operations used in each primitive.
4.3.1 Comparison with the Garbled Circuit-based Solutions
We empirically compared the performance of the matrix multiplication protocol ΠMP and batch
greater-than protocol ΠbGT with their garbled circuit counterpart implementations. The comparison
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Protocol Batch Greater-than Protocol ΠbGT
Inputs: Ciphertext of the integer vector a, b ∈ {0, 1, · · · , D − 1}θ for D, θ ∈ Z+.
Output: Ciphertext of the CRT-packed vector γ where the length of γ is θ ·D.
Remark: One can learn I{a[j] > b[j]} = I{0 ∈ {γ[k · θ + j]}D−1k=0 } from γ.
1. Compute a˜ = Repeat(Enc (picrt(a)), θ,D); b˜ = Repeat(Enc (picrt(b)) , θ,D).
2. Generate random permutations pij : {0, 1, · · · , D − 1} → {0, 1, · · · , D − 1} for 0 ≤ j < θ.
3. Compute a θ · D dimension vector w in which w[α(j)] = pij(α). Here α(j) := θ · α + j, for
α ∈ {0, 1, · · · , D − 1} and 0 ≤ j < θ.
4. Compute Enc (picrt(β)) = a˜− b˜− picrt(w).
5. Compute Enc (picrt(γ)) = Enc (picrt(β))⊗ picrt(r) where r U←− (Zt/{0})θ·D.
6. Output Enc (picrt(γ)).
Figure 4.2: Batch Greater-than Protocol
Sub-Protocol Repeat
Inputs: Ciphertext of CRT packed vector Enc (picrt(u)) and θ,R > 0.
Output: Ciphertext of the repeated vectors u˜ which repeats the first θ elements of u for R times.
1. u˜ = Enc (picrt(u))⊗ picrt([1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ
00 . . . ]); u = Enc (picrt(u˜)).
2. View R in the binary format R = (bρ · · · b1b0)2 where bρ is the most significant bit.
3. For 0 ≤ i ≤ ρ iterate as follows
a) If bi is 1 then u˜ = Rotate(u˜, k).
b) u˜ = u˜⊕ u.
c) u = u⊕ Rotate(u, k)
d) k = k × 2.
4. return u˜
Figure 4.3: Repeat Sub-Protocol.
results are shown in Figure 4.4. We first describe our experiment setup.
GC Setting. For GC, we used a state-of-the-art framework, i.e., ObliVM [Liu et al., 2015] which
allows us to implement the garbled circuit with a high-level programming language interface. We
used two physically separated machines as the circuit generator and the circuit evaluator. The
generator and evaluator held random shares of the private inputs. We ran the GC experiments on
two network settings: a Local Area Network (two machines located inside the same router) and
a Wide Area Network (one machine located in Japan and the other located on the west coast of
USA). The network bandwidth of LAN and WAN was about 88 Mbps and 48 Mbps, respectively.
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Table 4.1: Complexity of our primitives. d is the matrix dimension. ` denotes the number of slots
of the CRT packing. θ is the batch-size of the greater than protocol. We write “–” to indicate that
the homomorphic operation is not used.
addition multiplication rotation
X · u (Figure 4.1) O(d2/`) O(d2/`) O(d
2 log `
`
)
X + Y O(d2`) – –
X · Y (Figure 4.1) O(d3/`) O(d3/`) O(d
3 log `
`
)
bGT (Figure 4.2) O(d(θD)/`e) O(d(θD)/`e) O(logD)
In ObliVM, we used the real-mode which provides the garbled-row-reduction [Naor et al., 1999] and
free-XOR [Kolesnikov and Schneider, 2008] optimizations.
FHE Setting. In the executions of the FHE primitives, we assume an encryptor encrypts the
private inputs and uploads the ciphertexts to the server. The server operates the primitives on the
ciphertexts and obtains the result. A decryptor downloads the result from the server and gets the
plain result after the decryption. For performance measurement, we used the same network (LAN
and WAN) as GC. For FHE-based primitives, we implemented using eight parallels. We also used
different parameters in bGT and the matrix primitives. Specifically, we set the parameters of the
BGV’s scheme t = 67499 and Φm(X) with m = 5227 (i.e., ` = 1742) for evaluating the batch
greater-than primitive. On the other hand, we use t = 73213 and m = 27893 (i.e., ` = 78) for
evaluating the matrix primitives.
Performance Measurements. We employed three different performance measurements: evalu-
ation time, ciphertext size, and operation time. The operation time of our FHE-based primitives
includes the time of encryption, upload, evaluation, download, and decryption. The evaluation time
includes the time of evaluation only, which is independent of the network bandwidth. For the GC
implementations, we measured the time for circuit generation and the time for circuit evaluation.
When we use the FHE primitives as an independent two-party computation, the entire computa-
tion time is measured by the operation time. On the other hand, when the FHE primitives are used
as building blocks for a more complicated two-party computation, the outputs of the FHE primitives
are successively reused without interaction with the other party. In such reuses, encryption, upload,
and download are not processed, and thus the server does not need to communicate with encryptors
and decryptors. Thus, to measure the efficiency of our FHE primitives, we measured the evaluation
time, too. We note that we can not separately evaluate the evaluation time from operation time
for GC execution. Therefore, the evaluation time of GC is the same as the operation time in our
evaluation.
We also compared the size of ciphertexts that the FHE-based primitives output with the size of
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Figure 4.4: Performance numbers (averaged over 10 runs) of FHE-based and GC-based primitive
implementations. LAN and WAN were introduced. For the matrix addition and matrix multiplica-
tion, matrices with 32-bits values were used. The numbers on the figure (g) – figure (i) indicate the
number of AND-gates in the garbled circuits.
network packets exchanged during the execution of the GC-based primitives 1.
Evaluation Result: Greater-than. Figure 4.4a, Figure 4.4d, and Figure 4.4g show the perfor-
mances of the FHE-based and GC-based greater-than implementations. As shown in the results,
our FHE-based greater-than primitive offers competitive performances to its GC counterpart when
comparing relatively small integers such as integers with less than 16 bits. The complexity of the
FHE-based greater-than grows exponentially with the bit length. Thus, it seems inefficient for our
greater-than primitive to handle large numbers. Noting that descriptive statistics of ordinal or cat-
egorical attributes typically assumes small domains (e.g., 0 ≤ age ≤ 150), we consider 12 − 16-bits
to be sufficient to meet regular requirements in many cases.
Evaluation Result: Matrix Addition. Figure 4.4b, Figure 4.4e, and Figure 4.4h show the
1We counted the number of AND-gates (20 bytes each) in the circuit.
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performances of the FHE-based and GC-based implementations of matrix addition. Since we leverage
the CRT-packing for FHE encrypted matrices, the evaluation time of the FHE-based matrix addition
increases linearly with the matrix dimension. The FHE-based matrix addition can operate faster
than its GC counterpart in terms of evaluation time while the size of ciphertexts generated by
the FHE-based matrix addition was two magnitudes larger than that in the GC counterpart. The
operation time of the FHE-based matrix addition is thus greater than that of its GC counterpart.
We can also see that the evaluation time of the FHE-based matrix addition was smaller than the
operation time of the GC (Figure 4.4b). In the WAN setting, the operation times of these two
implementations were quite close. We emphasize that the performance of the GC-based matrix
addition and that of the FHE-based matrix addition are not directly comparable. If the matrix
addition itself is the target computation, the GC-based solution works faster. However, when we need
successive matrix additions in the middle of a larger computation, the FHE-based implementation
can provide competitive performance with its GC counterpart.
Evaluation Result: Matrix Multiplication. Figure 4.4c, Figure 4.4f, and Figure 4.4i show
the performances of FHE-based and GC-based implementations of matrix multiplication. The GC
implementation ran slightly faster than the FHE-based one in the LAN environment while in the
WAN environment, these two implementations performed almost the same regarding evaluation
time. Notice that the number of ciphertexts in the FHE-based matrix multiplication and that of the
FHE-based matrix addition were the same due to the layout-consistency of our matrix primitives.
On the other hand, the GC-based matrix multiplication exchanged more network packets than that
of the GC-based matrix addition. We can see that the evaluation time and operation time of the
FHE-based matrix multiplication were almost the same, indicating the time of network communi-
cation in FHE-based matrix multiplication is negligible. When we need to operate iterative matrix
multiplications, the FHE-based primitive, which requires less network communication time, can offer
better performance in terms of operation time.
From the experimental results, we can conclude that our two building blocks are viable for cloud-
based applications. We admit that our greater-than primitive might be inefficient for comparing
large numbers, but for many statistics, small domains such as sizes of several thousand might be
sufficient. Also, we have to transfer hundreds of megabytes of ciphertexts which seems to hinder the
performance of our FHE-based matrix primitives. But we are interested in the statistical analysis
rather than a single matrix addition or multiplication. For the FHE-based matrix primitives, the
number of generated ciphertexts is independent of the number of iterations. Thus, after the cloud
finishes the analysis, the cost of transferring the FHE ciphertexts might not be the bottleneck.
However, the network packets exchanged by the GC-based implementations increases linearly with
the number of iterations. In other words, for evaluating complex functions, e.g. functions with a
large multiplicative depth or functions with large fan-in, the communication time might become the
bottleneck of GC solutions. Moreover, FHE-based solutions enable to delegate the computation to
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the cloud, and allow the encryptor to perform encryption only.
4.4 Application: Secure Outsourcing Statistical Analysis
At a high level, FHE enables us to perform addition and multiplication on ciphertexts. Thus it
allows us to evaluate any function F on ciphertexts. We can decompose the input into bits and
encrypt each bit separately. Since addition and multiplication on {0, 1} are equivalent to the AND-
gate and the XOR-gate in boolean circuits, we can construct the corresponding boolean circuit for
the function F and evaluate the boolean circuit on ciphertexts. Such scheme has become widely
recognized as a technology to enable processing of private data without compromising privacy.
Computational resources of cloud computing are completely virtualized, which helps to reduce
the operational costs of service providers. However, such virtualization makes it difficult to keep
control of data. In many domains; for instance, medical, and financial ones, confidentiality and
privacy of data are one of the principal concerns raised in cloud-based applications. FHE schemes
provide a natural method to address these concerns by encrypting data in the cloud and performing
computations on ciphertexts without decrypting the data. Since FHE schemes theoretically allow
evaluating any function on ciphertexts, FHE schemes might enable us to use the cloud for outsourcing
computational tasks such as statistical analysis with a guarantee of data privacy.
Statistical analysis usually involves a large scale of data with a large number of dimensions. As a
result, conducting statistical analysis in a way that evaluates the corresponding boolean circuits on
FHE ciphertexts might be inefficient in practice, in terms of the memory usage and computational
time. On the other hand, we can avoid encrypting the data bit-by-bit to obtain more efficient
solutions. In Naehrig et al. [2011], Yasuda et al. [2013], and Lu et al. [2015], particular encoding
methods are used to obtain computationally and spatially efficient solutions on FHE ciphertexts.
We remark that these encoding methods are specifically designed for a certain statistical analysis
task. Thus it seems difficult to reuse these encoding methods for other tasks.
In this chapter, we focus on applications of FHE to statistical analysis with three types of data.
Our goal is to conduct a wide range of statistical analysis on FHE ciphertexts with computational
and space efficiency, using the proposed primitives in the previous section. In this work, we present
efficient procedures for a wide range of statistical analysis using just a few of generic data encodings.
Specifically, we use two encodings to conduct descriptive and predictive statistics including the
histogram (count, histogram order), contingency table with cell suppression, k-percentile, principal
component analysis, and linear regression.
Related Work. Several studies that realize evaluating descriptive statistics using FHE have been
reported. Evaluating the standard descriptive statistics such as the mean and standard deviation
from FHE ciphertexts are presented in [Naehrig et al., 2011]. In [Wu and Haven, 2012], they also show
how to compute the co-variance using FHE. Notice that these statistics involve numerical attributes
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only, while in the statistical analysis we also have categorical and ordinal data. For categorical and
ordinal statistics, such as histogram and k-percentile, we can use the private database query system
of [Boneh et al., 2013]. However, this method requires to evaluate a circuit with O(M) multiplicative
depths where M is the number of data points. Thereby, it would be practical only for a very small
M , e.g., M < 20.
For predictive statistics, the earlier study [Graepel et al., 2012] presents the construction of
building linear classifiers (i.e., the Linear Mean Classifier and Fisher’s Linear Discriminant Classifier)
from FHE encrypted data. More recently, the work of [Bost et al., 2015] shows three protocols for
private evaluation of hyperplane decision classifiers, naive Bayes classifiers and decision tree classifiers
on ciphertexts. Notice they focus on the model evaluation and the privacy-preserving model building
is beyond the scope of [Bost et al., 2015]. In [Wu and Haven, 2012], they present a protocol to train a
linear regression model from FHE encrypted data using Cramer’s rule for matrix inversion. Thereby,
the computational complexity of this method blows up factorially with the data dimension. In other
words, their method is only suitable for data with small dimensions. Indeed, only six dimension
data are used in [Wu and Haven, 2012]. To the best of our knowledge, no practical FHE solution
that trains the linear regression model from data with high dimension has been established.
4.4.1 Data Representations: Numerical, Categorical and Ordinal Data
In this paper, we aim to conduct a broad range of statistics of numerical, ordinal, and categorical
data. We firstly describe data representations for different types of attributes.
Categorical Attributes. The values of categorical attributes represent some states without mean-
ingful order. Let dc be the number of categorical attributes. We denote the domain of each cate-
gorical attribute as
Cj = {sj1, sj2, · · · , sj|Cj |}, 1 ≤ j ≤ dc,
where sjk is the k-th state of the attribute Cj . The cross-product gives the domain of the categorical
attributes C := C1 × · · · × Cdc . Let ci ∈ C be a vector of the categorical data. Then ci[j] ∈ Cj is a
categorical value of the j-th categorical attribute.
Ordinal Attributes. Values in an ordinal attribute have a meaningful ranking among them. We
designate the number of ordinal attributes as do. Similarly, the domain of each ordinal attribute is
represented as
Oj = {sˆj1, sˆj2, · · · , sˆj|Oj |}, 1 ≤ j ≤ do,
where sˆjk is the k-th state of the attribute Oj . The order of attribute values is given as sˆj1  · · · 
sˆj|Oj |. We also present the domain of the ordinal attributes as the cross-product O := O1×· · ·×Odo .
Let oi ∈ O be the i-th ordinal data. Then oi[j] is an ordinal value of the j-th ordinal attribute.
Numerical Attributes. In this paper, we presume that all the numerical values are integers since
the BGV’s scheme can only process integers. We use a fixed point number of finite precision. Given
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x ∈ R and ∆ ∈ Z, we have b∆xe ∈ Z where b·e rounds a real number to the nearest integer. Let dn
be the dimension of numerical data and x>i ∈ Zdnt be the i-th numerical data. The j-th element of
each vector is designated as the j-th numerical attribute.
We represent the collections of M categorical, ordinal, and numerical data points respectively as
follows.
C =

c>1
...
c>M
 ∈ CM O =

o>1
...
o>M
 ∈ OM X =

x>1
...
x>M
 ∈ ZM×dnt
Indicator Encoding Eid : Cj → {0, 1}|Cj |. Eid takes as input an attribute value sjk ∈ Cj and outputs
a vector with all elements zero except the k-th element, which is set to 1. For instance, presuming
|Cj | = 3, the indicator encoding of the second state sj2 will be Eid(sj2) = [0, 1, 0]. We construct
protocols of the histogram (count) and the contingency table using this encoding.
Staircase Encoding Est : Oj → {0, 1}|Oj |. Staircase encoding takes as input an attribute value
sˆjk ∈ Oj and outputs a binary vector. The staircase encoding sets the 1-st to the (k−1)-th elements
as 0 and sets the k-th to the last elements as 1. For example, presuming the domain size of |Oj | = 3,
the staircase encoding of the second state sˆj2 will be Est(sˆj2) = [0, 1, 1]. We use Est for the evaluation
of k-percentile.
4.4.2 Application Scenario and Stakeholders
We consider three stakeholders: encryptor, cloud, and decryptor. We assume all stakeholders behave
semi-honestly and the cloud does not collude with the decryptor. Let x be a private input of the
encryptor and f be a publicly known function. We consider the following model (Table 4.2). The en-
cryptor sends the ciphertext Enc (x) to the cloud for the computation of a particular functionality F .
The cloud operates specified homomorphic operations on Enc (x) and sends the resulting ciphertext
Enc (z = F(x)) to the decryptor. The decryptor decrypts the resulting ciphertext and learns z but
nothing else. The cloud and the encryptor learn nothing at the end of the execution of the protocol.
The encryptor sends the encryption of his private input following the data processing of different
types of data in Table 4.3. In the following protocol descriptions, we thus omit the encryption phase
of the encryptor.
4.4.3 Problem Statements: Descriptive Statistics and Predictive Statis-
tics
In this work, we consider statistical functions including the histogram (count and histogram order)
and contingency table (with cell suppression) for categorical attributes; the k-percentile for ordinal
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Table 4.2: Input-output relationships for the stakeholders. We write “–” to indicate no input or
output. Input and output are viewed as bits stream x, z ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Stakeholder Possess Input Output
encryptor pk, evk x –
cloud pk, evk – Enc (z)
decryptor pk, evk, sk – z
Table 4.3: A summary of the form of ciphertexts and statistics
Data Type Ciphertext Form Statistics
ci[q] ∈ Cq Enc (Eid(ci[q]))) histogram, count, histogram order
and contingency table
oi[p] ∈ Op Enc (Est(oi[p])) k-percentile
xi ∈ Zdc Enc (picrt(xi)) PCA and linear regression
attributes; and the principal component analysis and linear regression for numerical attributes. We
present these statistics in turn.
4.4.4 Descriptive Statistics
Single Categorical Attribute. Let {c1[j], . . . , cM [j]} be the j-th categorical attribute values of
M data points. If cijs are encoded by the indicator encoding, then the summation of vectors yields
the histogram.
Hist({c1[j], . . . , cM [j]}) = h where h =
M∑
i=1
Eid(ci[j]). (4.2)
The histogram query naturally gives the count and histogram order. The count of the state sjp can
be given as
Count({c1[j], . . . , cM [j]}, p) = 〈1p,h〉 , (4.3)
where 1p is an indicator vector of which the elements are 0 except the p-th element is 1.
The histogram order reveals the order of the counts of the histogram h. We define this function-
ality as
HistOrder({c1j , . . . , cMj}) = k, (4.4)
where the count of the state sjkx is not less than the count of the state s
j
ky
for any 1 ≤ x < y ≤ |Cj |.
Multiple Categorical Attributes. Next, we consider the evaluation of contingency tables of
two categorical attributes Cp and Cq. Evaluation of a contingency table corresponds to counting
combinations (spu, s
q
v) for all possible (u, v) pairs. We write µuv to denote the count of the combination
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Table 4.4: A contingency table of two categorical attributes Cp and Cq of M data points.
state sq1 · · · sq|Cq| Total
sp1 µ1,1 · · · µ1,|Cq| µ′1
...
...
. . .
...
...
sp|Cp| µ1,|Cp| · · · µ|Cp|,|Cq| µ′|Cp|
Total µ1 · · · µ|Cq| M
(spu, s
q
v). For instance, one categorical data point ci = [· · · , sp2, · · · , sq3, · · · ] contributes to the count
µ23 by 1. An example of the contingency table of attributes Cp and Cq is shown in Table 4.4. We
define the functionality of contingency table evaluation as
ContingencyTable({ci[p], ci[q]}Mi=1) = µ. (4.5)
In a contingency table, small counts represent rare individuals or cases of the population. For
concerns of individual privacy, applications that evaluate contingency tables with private data col-
lected from different sources usually additionally perform cell suppression [Nabar and Mishra, 2009,
Kirkendall and Sande, 1998] to conceal existence of individuals with rare combination of attribute
values. A common practice of the cell suppression is to zero-out the counts that are smaller than a
constant threshold T . The functionality of zero-out suppression can be defined as
CT-Suppression({ci[p], ci[q]}Mi=1, T ) = µ¯, (4.6)
where µ¯s = µs · I{µs > T } for 1 ≤ s ≤ |Cp||Cq|. Notice that µ is the output of ContingencyTable.
Ordinal Attributes. For the ordinal attributes, we consider k-percentile. k-percentile is the value
that separates given ordinal values into two parts so that the one part with lower values contains k %
of the data. For instance, the 50-percentile is also named as the median. Letting {o1[j], . . . ,oM [j]}
be the j-th ordinal attribute values of M data points, we can sort the ordinal values in ascending
order as opi(1)[j]  · · ·  opi(M)[j]. Here, pi is a permutation function that returns indices in
descending order. Using the notation of pi, we can define the k-percentile functionality as
k-Percentile(o1[j], . . . ,oM [j]) = oM∗ [j], (4.7)
where M∗ := pi(d(k ·M)/100e) and opi(i)[j]  opi(i+1)[j] holds for all 1 ≤ i < M .
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4.4.5 Predictive Statistics
Principal Component Analysis. PCA is a statistical procedure that converts a set of numerical
observations of possibly correlated variables into a small number of directions that are mutually
linearly independent. In PCA, we firstly compute a covariance matrix
Σ =
1
M
X>X − µµ> where µ = 1
M
M∑
i=1
x>i . (4.8)
Then we compute the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of Σ. Let the eigenvalues of Σ be λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λdn ,
and denote the corresponding eigenvectors as u1, . . . ,udn . An iterative algorithm (i.e., Power-
Method) can evaluate the k-th eigenvalue λk and the corresponding principal component uk with T
iterations.
PowerMethod (Σ, {λq}k−1q=1 , {uq}k−1q=1):
1. Σk := Σ−∑k−1q=1 λququ>q .
2. Choose a random vector v(0) U←− Z
dn
t .
3. For 0 ≤ τ < T , compute
v(τ+1) = Σkv
(τ). (4.9)
4. Output uk =
v(T )
‖v(T )‖ and λk =
‖v(T )‖
‖v(T−1)‖ .
Linear Regression. The problem of linear regression is to find a model that predicts values of a
numerical target variable from observations of numerical input variables using a linear equation. Let
{(x>i , yi)}Mi=1 be the given dataset in which x>i are the input variables and yi is the target variables.
The model of linear regression is given as y ≈ x>w. Therein, the model w is obtained by minimizing
the least-squares error:
w∗ = argminw
1
M
M∑
i=1
‖yi − x>i w‖22.
The analytical solution w∗ is given as
w∗ = (X>X)−1X>y, (4.10)
where the matrix X and vector y are the collections of numerical data. The Equation 4.10 is
immediately solved if we can evaluate the inverse of X>X. We leverage a division-free variant of
the iterative matrix inversion method from [Guo and Higham, 2006] so that we can compute the
matrix inversion on FHE encrypted matrices. Let M be a matrix, λ be a real value, and T be the
number of iterations. The division-free matrix inversion method works as follows.
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DF-MatrixInversion (M , λ, T ):
1. Initialize A(0) = M ,R(0) = I, α(0) = λ.
2. For 0 ≤ τ < T , compute
R(τ+1) = 2α(τ)R(τ) −R(τ)A(τ),
A(τ+1) = 2α(τ)A(τ) −A(τ)A(τ),
α(τ+1) = α(τ)α(τ).
(4.11)
3. Output R(T ).
Here I is an identity matrix. This method approximates the inverse of the matrix M . According
to the analysis of Guo and Higham [2006], R(τ) converges to λ2
τ
M−1 quadratically if λ is close to
the largest eigenvalue of M .
4.4.6 Computing Descriptive Statistics from Ciphertexts
This section presents the details of evaluating the statistics described in Section 4.4.3 on FHE
encrypted data.
Histogram and Count. The evaluations of Equation 4.2 (histogram) and Equation 4.3 (count) on
FHE encrypted categorical data are straightforward using the CRT-packing and indicator encoding.
For the collection of categorical data C ∈ CM , we can compute the histogram of Cp, i.e. the p-th
attribute, as ⊕Mi=1Enc (Eid(ci[p])). Also, we can compute the histograms of multiple attributes simul-
taneously. For instance ⊕Mi=1Enc (Eid(ci[p])‖Eid(ci[q])) gives the histograms of Cp and Cq. Moreover,
to give the count of specific attribute values, we need one more homomorphic multiplication. For
example,
(⊕Mi=1Enc (Eid(ci[p])))⊗picrt(13) gives the ciphertext of the count for sp3, i.e., the third state
of the attribute of Cp. Similarly, we can give multiple counts simultaneously.
Histogram Order. The evaluation of Equation 4.4 requires computing the order of the counts in
the histogram, which indicates that comparisons of encrypted integers are needed. Our method for
calculating the histogram order on ciphertexts splits into two stages: one for operating bGT and the
other for recovering the histogram order from the outputs of bGT. In the second stage, we need to
decrypt the outputs of bGT. In the protocol, the matrix ∆ just acts as a handy helper for us to
calculate the histogram order.
Theorem 4. (Correctness.) The ΠHistOrder protocol correctly implements the histogram order func-
tionality of Equation 4.4 under the semi-honest setting.
Proof. The protocol ΠHistOrder of Figure 4.5 calls the bGT primitive O(|Cj |2) times. By operating
these comparisons, we have obtained the order of the values of the histogram. According to bGT, if
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Protocol ΠHistOrder
Input from encryptors: Ciphertexts of categorical data of the j-th attribute {Enc (Eid(ci[j]))}Mi=1
Output of the cloud: Ciphertexts {Enc (γuv)}1≤u<v≤|Cj |
Remark: Decryptor can learn the histogram order Equation 4.2 from γuv.
The cloud:
1. Computes the histogram Enc (h) =
⊕M
i=1 Enc (Eid(ci[j])).
2. Computes Enc (hp) = Replicate(Enc (h) , p) for 1 ≤ p ≤ |Cj |.
3. For all 1 ≤ u < v ≤ |Cj | pairs, invokes the routine of Figure 4.2 with D = M and θ = 1, and
obtains
Enc (γuv) = bGT(Enc (h[u]) ,Enc (h[v])).
4. Outputs ciphertexts {Enc (γuv)}1≤u<v≤|Cj |.
The decryptor:
5. Constructs a matrix ∆ ∈ {0, 1}|Cj |×|Cj | according to the decryption of {Enc (γuv)}1≤u<v≤|Cj |.
a) The diagonal of ∆ is set to 0, that is ∆[u, u] = 0.
b) For all (u, v) pairs such that 1 ≤ u < v ≤ |Cj |, set δuv = 1{0 ∈ γuv} and set ∆[v, u] = 1−∆[u, v].
6. Outputs a vector k with the value k[l] set as the row-index of ∆ which contains exactly |Cj | − l
of 1s for 1 ≤ l ≤ |Cj |.
Figure 4.5: Protocol ΠHistOrder for Private Histogram Order.
0 ∈ γuv holds then we know that the count of state sju is larger than that of state sjv, which follows
exactly the histogram order functionality.
K-percentile. We conduct the k-percentile of the attribute Oj on FHE ciphertexts as ΠkP of
Figure 4.6. The decryptor can derive the k-percentile of the attribute Oj from γ. Indeed, we obtain
the cumulative frequencies of the j-th ordinal data {o1[j], . . . ,oM [j]} in Step 1 due to the use of
staircase encoding. For instance, let us consider the ordinal data {sˆj1, sˆj2, sˆj3, sˆj3, sˆj1, sˆj2} for M = 6.
Then the summation in Step 1 gives cumulative frequencies f = [2, 4, 6]. To get the k-percentile,
we only need to find out, from left to right, the first frequency that is larger than kM/100. In the
previous example, we know sˆj2 is the 50-percentile point because f1 < 3 ∧ f2 ≥ 3.
Theorem 5. (Correctness.) The protocol ΠkP of Figure 4.6 correctly implements the k-percentile
functionality of Equation 4.7 under the semi-honest setting.
Proof. The Step 1 of Figure 4.6 gives the ciphertext of cumulative frequencies of the j-th or-
dinal attribute. If sˆjn∗ is the k-percentile, Step 2 gives a ciphertext of a vector γ such that
0 /∈ {γk|Oj |+n∗−1}M−1k=0 while 0 ∈ {γk|Oj |+n∗}M−1k=0 , since the input to the bGT in Step 2 is the (en-
crypted) cumulative frequencies of the j-th ordinal attribute. For the boundary conditions, we can
determine that sˆj1 is the k-percentile point if 0 is absent in γ. On the other hand if 0 ∈ {γk|Oj |+n∗}N−1k=0
for all possible n∗, we know that the last attribute state sˆj|Oj | is the k-percentile of the population.
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Protocol ΠkP
Input from encryptors: Ciphertexts of j-th ordinal attribute. {Enc (Est(oi[j]))}Mi=1. Positive integer
0 ≤ k ≤ 100.
Output of the cloud: Ciphertexts of a vector γ where |γ| = M · |Oj |.
Remark: The decryptor can learn k-percentile of the j-th ordinal attribute from γ.
The cloud:
1. Aggregates the ciphertexts via additions c =
⊕M
i=1 Enc (Est(oi[j])).
2. Invokes bGT on the aggregated ciphertext:
Enc (picrt(γ)) = bGT(c,M · k/100)
with D = M and θ = |Oj | as the parameters of the bGT protocol.
3. Outputs Enc (picrt(γ)) to the decryptor.
The decryptor:
4. Decrypts Enc (picrt(γ)) as γ.
5. Finds out an index 1 ≤ n∗ ≤ |Oj | s.t. 0 /∈ {γk|Oj |+n∗−1}N−1k=0 and 0 ∈ {γk|Oj |+n∗}N−1k=0 . If no such
n∗ exists, sets the value of n∗ as
n∗ =
{
1 if 0 /∈ γ
|Oj | o.w.
6. The k-percentile of the j-th ordinal attribute is output as sˆjn∗ .
Figure 4.6: Protocol ΠkP for Private k-percentile.
Eid(ci[p]) Eid(ci[p]) Eid(ci[p])
element-wise multi. Eid(ci[q]) Eid(ci[q])
contribute to µ1,1 µ2,2 – µ2,1 µ1,2 –
Figure 4.7: One multiplication gives 2 × 2 combinations of attributes of ci[p] ∈ Cp and ci[q] ∈ Cq
where |Cp| = 2 and |Cq| = 2.
Contingency Table with Cell Suppression. The count µu,v in the contingency table (i.e.,
Table 4.4) is given by the x-th element of µ where (x− 1) ≡ (u− 1) mod k1 and (x− 1) ≡ (v − 1)
mod k2
2. We present a concrete example in Figure 4.7, in which the domain sizes are |Cp| = |Cq| = 2
and k1 = 2, k2 = 3. In Figure 4.7, the white cells indicate 0 since we use 0-padding in the CRT-
packing. Thereby element-wise multiplications on these positions only give 0, and thus no other
information except the contingency table are revealed. The co-prime duplication plays a major role
in the above evaluation.
Theorem 6. (Correctness.) The protocol of Figure 4.8 correctly implements the functionality of
Equation 4.6 (contingency table with suppression) under the semi-honest model.
2Indices start from 1.
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Protocol ΠCTS
Inputs: Ciphertexts of the p-th and q-th categorical data {Enc (Eid(ci[p])) ,Enc (Eid(ci[q]))}Mi=1. The
cell suppression threshold T > 0. Let Σ := |Cp| · |Cq| as the product of the size of the categorical
attributes.
Outputs: Ciphertexts a′, b′ and b∗.
Remarks: One can learn the cell suppressed contingency table defined in Equation 4.6 from the
decryptions of a′, b′ and b∗.
The cloud:
1. Finds the smallest co-prime integers k1 and k2 such that k1 ≥ |Cp| and k2 ≥ |Cq|.
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤M , computes
pi = Repeat (Enc (Eid(ci[p])) , k1, k2)
qi = Repeat(Enc (Eid(ci[q])) , k2, k1).
3. Computes a =
⊕M
i=1 pi ⊗ qi.
4. Invokes bGT: b = bGT(a, T ) with D = M and θ = Σ for the bGT protocol.
5. Computes b′ = b⊕ picrt(δ) where δ U←− ZΣt .
6. Computes a′ = a ⊕ picrt(r) where the length of the vector r is M · Σ, r[k · Σ + x] = δ[x] for
0 ≤ k < N , and 1 ≤ x ≤ Σ.
7. Samples r∗ U←− (Zt/{0})M·Σ and computes b∗ = b⊗ picrt(r∗).
8. Outputs ciphertexts a′, b′ and b∗.
The decryptor:
9. Decrypts a′, b′ and b∗ to a′, b′ and b∗ ∈ ZM·Σt , respectively.
10. Finds out the set SZ := {(s, z = k · Σ + s)|b∗[k · Σ + s] = 0, 1 ≤ s ≤ Σ, 0 ≤ k < N}.
11. Outputs µˆ where µˆ[s] = b′[z]− a′[z] for (s, z) ∈ SZ.
Figure 4.8: Protocol ΠCTS for Private Contingency Table with Cell Suppression.
Proof. (Correctness.) We now describe the idea of our cell suppression protocol ΠCTS of Figure 4.8.
Without loss of generality, we presume that µ[s] > T for some specific 1 ≤ s ≤ Σ. According to the
bGT protocol of Figure 4.2, we have one and only one 0 in the set Γs := {b[k · Σ + s]}M−1k=0 (where
b is the decryption of b in Step 4 of Figure 4.8). This enables us to hide numbers. If we have only
one 0 in Γs, we can recover the value of µ[s] from the tuple {µ[s] + δ, δ +˙ Γs, r∗ · Γs} with some
non-zero random value r∗. Here the mathematical operations are carried out on each element of Γs.
On the other hand, if µ[s] ≤ T , after the execution of the bGT protocol we have 0 /∈ Γs. We can
not recover the value of µs from the tuple. Thereby, the suppression is achieved.
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4.4.7 Computing Predictive Statistics from Ciphertexts
Principal Component Analysis. For the evaluation of PCA, we can perform the computation
of Equation 4.8 and Equation 4.9 on ciphertexts directly. Given the collection of numerical data
X ∈ ZN×dnt , we evaluate the first principal component with T iterations as the protocol ΠPCA
of Figure 4.9. Step 1 and Step 2 follow Equation 4.8 except we can not perform the division on
ciphertexts. Notice that, in Step 2, the operation generates ciphertexts of a matrix, i.e., M2Σ.
The evaluation in Step 3 is also straightforward using our matrix–vector multiplication primitives
of Equation 4.1.
Protocol ΠPCA
Inputs: Ciphertexts of the numerical data {Enc (picrt(x>i )) ,Enc (picrt(xix>i ))}Mi=1. Number of itera-
tions T .
Outputs: Ciphertexts v(T ) and v(T−1).
Remarks: One can learn the (approximated) largest eigenvalue and the associated eigenvector from
the decryptions of v(T ) and v(T−1).
The cloud:
1. Computes Enc (picrt(M · µ)) = ⊕Mi=1 Enc (picrt(x>i )).
2. Computes Enc
(
picrt(M
2Σ)
)
=
(
M ⊗⊕Mi=1 Enc (xix>i ))	Enc (picrt(M · µ))⊗Enc (picrt(M · µ>)) .
3. From 0 ≤ τ < T , iterates
v(τ+1) = Enc
(
picrt(M
2Σ)
)⊗ v(τ),
where v(0) is initialized as any non-zero vector.
4. Outputs v(T ) and v(T−1).
The decryptor:
5. Decrypts v(T ) and v(T−1) to vectors v(T ) and v(T−1), respectively. Outputs the largest eigenvalue
as λ1 = ‖v(T )‖/‖v(T−1)‖ and the associated eigenvector as u1 = v(T )/‖v(T )‖.
Figure 4.9: Protocol ΠPCA for Private Principal Component Analysis.
Theorem 7. (Correctness.) The protocol ΠPCA of Figure 4.9 correctly implements the functionality
of Equation 4.9 with approximations under the semi-honest model.
Linear Regression. To conduct the linear regression of Equation 4.10, we need to compute the
inverse of the design matrix X>X. To do so, we use the DF-MatrixInversion procedure in Equa-
tion 4.11. The evaluation of Equation 4.11 on ciphertexts are straightforward using our matrix
multiplication primitive of Figure 4.1. Given the collection of numerical data {(x>i , yi)}Mi=1 and the
largest eigenvalue λ1 of the design matrix, we can evaluate Equation 4.10 with T iterations as the
protocol of Figure 4.10.
The DF-MatrixInversion in Step 3 computes the matrix inversion with a known factor λ2
T
1 .
Thereby, the output ciphertext w is the linear regression model w∗ argumened by the factor λ2
T
1 .
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Protocol ΠLR
Inputs: Ciphertexts of the numerical data {Enc (picrt(yix>i )) ,Enc (picrt(xix>i ))}Mi=1. The ciphertext of
the largest eigenvalue Enc (λ1) and the number of iterations T .
Outputs: One encrypted vector w.
Remarks: One can learn the (approximated) linear regression model w∗ with the largest eigenvalue
λ1 and the decryption of w.
The cloud:
1. Aggregates the ciphertexts
Enc
(
picrt(X
>y)
)
=
N⊕
i=1
Enc
(
picrt(yix
>
i )
)
Enc
(
picrt(X
>X)
)
=
N⊕
i=1
Enc
(
picrt(xix
>
i )
)
.
2. Invokes the DF-MatrixInversion procedure of Equation 4.11
Enc
(
picrt(λ
2T
1 (X
>X)−1)
)
= DF-MatrixInversion
(
Enc
(
picrt(X
>X)
)
,Enc (λ1) , T
)
.
3. Outputs w = Enc
(
picrt(λ
2T
1 (X
>X)−1)
)
⊗ Enc (picrt(X>y)).
The decryptor:
4. The decryptor decrypts w to the vector w and outputs w∗ as w/λ2
T
1 .
Figure 4.10: Protocol ΠLR for Private Linear Regression.
Theorem 8. (Correctness.) The protocol of Figure 4.10 correctly implements the linear regression
functionality of Equation 4.10 with approximation under the semi-honest model.
4.4.8 Evaluation
We implemented our building blocks and all the procedures that is described in Section 4.4.6. Our
implementations were written in C++, and we used the HElib library [Halevi and Shoup, 2017]
for the implementation of the BGV scheme. We compiled our code using g++ 4.9.2 on a machine
running Ubuntu 14.04.4 with eight 2.60GHz Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2640 v3 processors and 32 GB of
RAM. The proposed procedures and the PPE technique are parallelizable. We leveraged 8 parallels
in our benchmarks to accelerate the computation.
We used multiple parameter sets in our benchmarks to show the best performance of our proce-
dures. Our choices for selecting the parameters of the HElib are shown in Table 4.5. In this table,
we have modulo parameter tk, the number of slots of the CRT-packing `, levels parameter L, the
parameter for cyclotomic polynomial m, the number of coprime moduli K, and the security level κ.
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We used at most K = 8 moduli and for each modulo we set tk ≈ 236 to achieve about 300-bit preci-
sion. Specifically, we used parameter set (I) for evaluating the PrivateHistOrder, Private k-Percentile
procedures. The evaluations of PrivateContingencyTable and PCT-Suppression used parameter set
(II) while the evaluations of PrivatePCA and PrivateLR use the set (III).
We conducted experiments on five datasets from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [Lich-
man, 2013]. For detailed discussions, we focus on one of them, the Adult dataset, which includes
M = 32561 records with 6 numerical attributes, 7 categorical attributes, and 1 ordinal attribute.
Specifically, to show the scalability of the ΠPCA and ΠLR protocols, we also gave the benchmarks on
other four datasets.
Plaintext Precision Expansion (PPE). We have described straightforward procedures to con-
duct the PCA and linear regression on ciphertexts, using our matrix primitives. However, we still
have an issue in implementing these procedures. That is, the current implementation of the BGV
scheme, i.e., the HElib [Halevi and Shoup, 2017], only allows a maximum of 60-bits plaintext preci-
sion which might not be sufficiently large enough for conducting the PCA and linear regression. We
show an example of this below.
We take the PCA as an example. Assume that the dn×dn covariance matrix Σ (as Equation 4.8)
is B-bounded, i.e. |σij | ≤ B for all σij ∈ Σ. After T iterations, the output from Equation 4.9
is bounded by dTn∆
T+1BT+1. Recall that we need to introduce a fixed magnifier ∆ to convert
the real values to integers. Presuming that we use B = 102, ∆ = 103, and dn = 5, then the
estimation above reveals that T = 3 iterations are not allowed because d3n∆
4B4 ≈ 273 exceeds 260,
the maximum plaintext precision. As a result, the 60-bits precision makes it possible to perform
only a few iterations on ciphertexts. However, the iterative algorithms we used for the PCA and
linear regression might not give converged solutions within a few iterations, which means we can
obtain only very rough approximations for the PCA and linear regression. To address this, we need
to perform more iterations, which requires a higher plaintext precision.
We introduce PPE to achieve a higher plaintext precision with the application of the Chinese-
Remainder-Theorem (CRT). Let f be the function that we evaluate, and let x be the input of f .
Suppose that f(x) > 260. We, thus, cannot directly evaluate f on the ciphertext of x since we
cannot offer plaintext with values larger than 260. To alleviate this problem, we with K distinct
plaintext spaces and get K values as {f(x) mod tk}Kk=1, where tk < 260 for all k. According to the
CRT, if we have gcd(tk, tk′) = 1 for all k 6= k′, then from the set of values {f(x) mod tk}Kk=1, we
can uniquely determine the value which is equal to f(x) mod t for t =
∏K
k=1 tk. Thereby we can
obtain f(x) by using such small tk’s with product is larger than f(x). If we fix the magnitude of
tk, then we can achieve any desired precision by adjusting K for a desired precision. Indeed, PPE
is achieved at the expense of increasing both computational and communication cost by a factor K
while PPE is totally parallelizable. We can also apply the PPE to the evaluation of the descriptive
statistics.
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Table 4.5: Parameter sets of the BGV scheme. tk denotes the coefficient modulo. ` is the number of
slots of the CRT packing. L is the number of primes in the ciphertext moduli. K is the expansion
factor used in for PPE. κ is the security level for that parameter set.
tk ` L m K κ
(I) 67499 1742 5 5227 1 90
(II) 8191 4096 10 16384 1 80
(III) ≈ 236 ≈ 70 32 27893 ≤ 8 110
Parameters of HElib. To achieve the best performance, we need to choose the parameters of the
HElib appropriately. We determined the parameters of the HElib based on the three concerns.
1. To provide the desired security level.
2. To offer sufficient spaces of the CRT packing, i.e. `.
3. To operate the homomorphic rotation efficiently.
In our experiments, we used parameters shown in Table 4.5. These parameter sets offer at least
80-bit security level and provide the number of slots up to several thousand.
Error Ratio. Our private PCA and LR procedures use iterative algorithms and fixed-precision
values. It thus introduces error. We write λ∗ and w∗ to denote the solutions to the PCA and
the LR, respectively. We write λˆ and wˆ to denote the outputs obtained from our PCA and LR
procedures. We define the error ratio of our procedures as follows.
Errorλ∗ =
|λ∗ − λˆ|
λ∗
Errorw∗ =
‖w∗ − wˆ‖2
‖w∗‖2 .
This error ratio definition enables us to estimate the loss of accuracy.
4.4.9 Evaluation
We measured the time of procedure evaluation and time of results decryption. We give the standard
deviations only for the evaluation time due to the space limit, and remark that standard deviations
for decryption times were negligible in our experiments.
Evaluation Results: Histogram Order & K-percentile. Table 4.6 shows the experimental
results of the ΠHistOrder and ΠkP protocols. For the histogram order (upper part), we ran the exper-
iments on two categories workclass and education, which respectively consists of 8 and 16 attribute
values. The time of decryption became the largest part as M was increased. That was because we
needed to decrypt d(|Cj |2 ·M)/`e ciphertexts. The decryption is totally parallelizable so it can be
easily reduced by using more cores.
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Table 4.6: Benchmark (adult dataset) of the ΠHistOrder (Figure 4.5) and ΠkP (Figure 4.6). Values are
averaged over 10 runs.
Protocol Domain # records M Evaluation Decryption
ΠHistOrder
|Cj | = 8
500 1.26 ± 0.145s 1.26s
1k 1.31 ± 0.157s 1.23s
10k 2.72 ± 0.289s 4.80s
32k 6.28 ± 0.484s 13.2s
|Cj | = 16
500 2.42 ± 0.439s 3.27s
1k 2.53 ± 0.336s 3.30s
10k 6.24 ± 0.448s 13.6s
32k 13.8 ± 1.38s 41.2s
ΠkP |Oj | = 100
500 4.768 ± 0.12s 3.27s
1k 9.487 ± 0.92s 3.11s
10k 97.515± 1.60s 18.6s
32k 321.285 ± 21.7s 48.8s
Table 4.7: Benchmark of the protocol ΠCTS (Figure 4.8). Values are averaged over 10 runs.
Attributes # records M Evaluation Decryption
|Cp| = 8, |Cq| = 6
500 35.69 ± 1.55s 3.84s
1k 68.42 ± 4.17s 7.45s
2k 155.26 ± 20.01s 14.83s
4K 287.02 ± 10.10s 30.00s
For the k-percentile procedures, we conducted the experiments with the ordinal attribute age
from the adult dataset and presumed that the domain size |Oj | = 100. As long as n < ` (i.e., 1742),
the time for download and decryption were steady. When n > `, the decryption time increased
almost linearly with n. To reduce the response time, the analyst can choose the parameters of BGV
that offer a larger `.
Evaluation Results: Contingency Table. Table 4.7 shows the benchmarks of the ΠCTS. We ran
the experiments on two categories workclass and relationship, which respectively consists of 8 and 6
attribute values. The time of evaluation and decryption grow linearly with the number of data M ,
but this computation is entirely parallelizable in our ΠCTS protocol. We can easily accelerate this
procedure with a higher level of parallelism.
Most of the decryption time in the ΠCTS protocol is the time of decrypting the output of the
bGT protocol due to the suppression functionality.
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Table 4.8: Benchmarks of the PCA and LR protocol (adult dataset): ∆ stands for magnification
constant; T denotes the number of iterations. K is the expansion factor. Values are averaged over
10 runs.
(a) PCA (for the 1-st principal component)
∆ T K Evaluation Decryption
3 2 67.3 ± 4.89s 0.876s
10 4 3 99.9 ± 4.77s 0.848s
5 3 122 ± 2.63s 0.874s
3 3 70.6 ± 4.19s 0.848s
100 4 4 104 ± 7.68s 1.27s
5 4 128 ± 7.93 1.26s
3 3 72.7 ± 2.12s 0.96s
1000 4 4 108 ± 4.06s 1.25s
5 5 136 ± 5.67s 1.43s
(b) Linear Regression (the time of one call of PCA
were omitted)
∆ T K Evaluation Decryption
1 1 173 ± 9.12s 0.475s
10 2 3 341 ± 8.12s 0.428s
3 5 672 ± 9.76s 0.618s
1 2 160 ± 3.97s 0.397s
100 2 4 400 ± 27.8s 0.649s
3 7 787 ± 10.5s 0.816s
1 2 164 ± 8.25s 0.388s
1000 2 4 383 ± 10.0s 0.622s
3 8 865 ± 11.7s 0.944s
Evaluation Results: PCA & Linear Regression. We used three different magnification con-
stants ∆ and three different iteration numbers T to benchmark the PCA protocol (only for the 1-st
principal component). The results are shown in Table 4.8a.
By applying the CRT-packing, the number of ciphertexts to transfer and decrypt during the
post-processing phase are O(ddn/`e), which is independent of the number of records M . As shown
in Table 4.8a, the download and decryption time were steady. It took less than 3 minutes to evaluate
one principal component with a low error ratio Errorλ∗ < 0.1.
The experimental results of the LR protocol ΠLR are shown in Table 4.8b. We omit here the
computation time for obtaining the largest eigenvalue λ1. Similarly, we benchmarked the protocol in
9 settings. For the same reason as for the PCA protocol, the time to download and the time to decrypt
the output from our LR protocol were negligible. The matrix inversion converges quadratically. We
thus achieved a error ratio Errorw∗ < 10
−3 within a few iterations. For the pre-processing time, it
took about 17 minutes to achieve the error guarantee.
Extra Experiments for the Predictive Statistics. The extra experimental results of the PCA
protocol (the 1-st principal component only) and the LR protocol are shown in Table 4.9. Here, we
used ∆ = 1000 and T = 3, and the running time for the evaluation and decryption were listed. We
can see that the running time of the PCA procedure increases linearly with the input dimension dn,
while the running time of the LR procedure increases quadratically with dn.
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Table 4.9: Experimental results of the PCA and LR protocol using UCI datasets. dn stands for the
number of numerical attributes.
Data set dn M PCA (eval/decrypt) LR (eval/decrypt)
adult 6 32561 141.21s/ 2.36s 872.82s / 1.59s
autompg 7 398 149.80s/ 1.82s 950.93s / 1.47s
wine-equality 12 4898 217.32s / 1.94 3543.76s / 1.68s
forestfires 13 513 299.38s / 1.87s 3757.99s / 1.59s
communities 20 1994 472.98s / 1.86s 10871.34s / 1.76s
Table 4.10: Model classification
Class Protocol Input x Output z f(x)
model-I
Matrix addition X,Y X + Y X + Y
Matrix multiplication X,Y XY XY
ΠoGT (see Chapter 6) a, b I{a > b} I{a > b}
ΠPDT (see Chapter 6) a, T T (a) T (a)
model-II
ΠbGT a, b γ I{a > b}
ΠCTS {Eid(cp[j]), Eid(cq[j])}Mi=1 µ′,γ′,γ∗ µˆ (Eq. 4.6)
ΠkP {Est(oi[j])}Mi=1 γ sˆjn∗ (Eq. 4.7)
ΠHistOrder {Eid(ci[j])}Mi=1 {γuv}1≤u<v≤|Cj | k (Eq. 4.4)
ΠPCA {x>i ,xix>i }Mi=1 v(T ),v(T−1) u1, λ1 (Eq. 4.9)
ΠLR {yix>i ,xix>i , λ1}Mi=1 λ2
T
1 w
∗ w∗ (Eq. 4.10)
4.5 Security Analysis
We also assume that all stakeholders hold the encryption key pk while only the decryptor holds the
decryption key sk. We focus on secure outsourcing in this paper. Thus, we do not discuss the phase
of key generation and key distribution.
The outline of our secure outsourcing that evaluates deterministic function f proceeds as follows.
We consider the following two models for the security analysis.
Model-I (z = f(x)). The encryptor encrypts his private input x and sends Enc (x) to the cloud.
The cloud homomorphically evaluates f on Enc (x) and sends Enc (f(x)) to the decryptor. The
decryptor decrypts Enc (f(x)) and obtains f(x).
Model-II (z 6= f(x)). The encryptor encrypts his private input x and sends Enc (x) to the cloud.
The cloud performs specified homomorphic operations on Enc (x) and sends the resulting ciphertext
Enc (z) to the decryptor. The decryptor decrypts Enc (z) and obtains z. The decryptor derives f(x)
from z by some local post-processing.
We summarize the model classification of the proposed protocols in Table 4.10. We give the
security statements about the protocols.
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Theorem 9. We assume all stakeholders behave semi-honestly and assume that the decryptor and
the cloud do not collude with each other. Let x be a private input of the encryptor. If the FHE
scheme provides semantic security, after execution of the protocol for f , the decryptor learns z but
nothing else. The encryptor and the cloud learn nothing.
We give the proof of Theorem 9 in the next paragraph. If z = f(x), Theorem 9 guarantees the
security of the protocol for f . If z 6= f(x), we need to show that z reveals nothing but f(x). For
some protocols (i.e. ΠbGT,ΠCTS,ΠkP and ΠHistOrder), we show that z does not reveal any information
except f(x). However, in our construction, we allow the protocol of ΠPCA and ΠLR to output z
that contains information more than f(x) for the sake of efficiency. We discuss these points in the
following.
Security Analysis. We give a sketch proof of Theorem 9 and defer the full argument to the full
version of our paper. Our proof follows the simulation-based paradigm Goldreich [2009]. Let the
view of the encryptor, decryptor, and the cloud during the execution of the protocol be Ve, Vd, and
Vc, respectively. Notice that the encryptor does not receive any message from other entities.
Proof of Theorem 9 (Sketch). Let pk be the encryption key used by the encryptor. From the con-
struction of the protocol, the security against the semi-honest encryptor and the semi-honest de-
cryptor are apparent. So, we omit the proofs for the encryptor and decryptor.
Security against a semi-honest cloud follows from the fact that the view of the cloud, Vc, consists
of {pk,Encpk(x),Encpk(z)}. We can simply construct a simulator Sc as follow. Sc firstly randomly
chooses values x′ and z′. Then Sc simulates Vc by Vˆc = {pk,Encpk(x′),Encpk(z′)}. Since the FHE
provides semantic security by assumption, Vc and Vˆc are indistinguishable. Thus, our protocols are
secure at the presence of a semi-honest cloud.
Security Discussion under Model-II. For protocols classified in the model-II, the decryptor
obtains f(x) with some post-processing on z. We show that z reveals nothing except f(x) for
certain protocols.
Batch Greater-Than. In bGT(Enc (a) ,Enc (b)) (we assume that θ = 1), if a ≤ b holds then the
output z consists of D uniform random values from Zt/{0} and reveals nothing but the output.
If a > b, we have one 0 in γ at a position selected randomly and values at remaining positions
distribute uniformly on Zt/{0}. Thereby, from z the decryptor can only learn 1{a > b} but nothing
else.
Contingency Table with Cell Suppression. We use bGT to compare Σ values in the contingency
table, i.e., µ, with the threshold T . Since these comparisons are independent of each other, we focus
on a specific µs. γ
∗ is the output from the bGT (each element are multiplied with non-zero random
values). If µs > T , we have one 0 in set Γs := {γ∗kΣ+s}N−1k=0 at a random position and remaining
values are all random. Otherwise, Γs consists of uniform random values on Zt/{0}. Presume that,
in the set Γs, we have γ
∗
k′Σ+s = 0. Then the decryptor can learn µˆs = µ
′
s − γ′k′ which is the desired
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output. On the other hand if µs ≤ T , for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Σ, value µ′s − γ′k is uniformly distributed on
Zt/{0}. Consequently, from the output z, the decryptor only learns µˆ and nothing else.
k-Percentile. The output z of the k-percentile protocol comes from the bGT. From z, the decryptor
learns that cumulative frequencies before sˆjn∗ are less than dkM/100e and cumulative frequencies of
sˆjn′ with n
′ > n∗ are larger than dkM/100e. That is equivalent to knowing that sˆjn∗ is the k-percentile
of the population. Since the bGT reveals nothing except the comparison results, the k-percentile
protocol reveals to the decryptor no more than that sˆjn∗ is the k-percentile.
Histogram Order. The histogram order protocol invokes bGT O(|Cj |2) times to compare |Cj |
values in the histogram and outputs the comparison results. Since the bGT reveals nothing except
the comparison results, it is straightforward to see that the PrivateHistOrder protocol reveals to the
decryptor no more than the order of counts in the histogram.
Principal Component Analysis. In this protocol, the decryptor receives two vectors, v(T ) and
v(T−1). He learns the largest eigenvalue λ1 = ‖v(T )‖/‖v(T−1)‖ and the associated eigenvector
u1 = v
(T )/‖v(T )‖. Precisely speaking, the difference of the direction of v(T ) and v(T−1) can contain
some information about the inputs. However, due to the geometric convergence property of the power
method algorithm, the difference of the directions is negligible after a sufficient number of iterations.
We consider that it is worth letting the decryptor perform the division after the decryption for the
sake of efficiency.
Linear Regression. In this protocol, the output z = λ2
T
1 w
∗. We can see that the only information
leaked to the decryptor is the iteration number T . Precisely speaking, T can contain some informa-
tion about the condition number of X>X, which is related to the eigenvalues of X>X. However,
it is not likely that the decryptor can recover (a part of) X from T . Thereby, letting the decryptor
perform the division after the decryption can lead to a more efficient evaluation.
Chapter 5
Communication Efficient Batch
Inner Products
5.1 Target Functionality and the Basic Protocol
In the previous chapters, we have presented cryptographic approaches for computing multiplication
of encrypted matrices via inner product of encrypted vectors. These methods have their advan-
tages, i.e., low computation overhead (ΠIP of Figure 3.1) or supporting iterative computation (ΠMP
of Figure 4.1). However, these methods do not count the communication overhead as a requirement.
In some cases, such as client–server applications, the communication overhead between the client
and the server might be the most important concern, since increasing the outgoing bandwidth of
the server is more difficult than increasing the computing power.
The matrix multiplication can be represented as a batch inner products functionality of Fig-
ure 5.1. The method of Mohassel and Zhang [2017], Demmler et al. [2015] for this functionality has
a relative small communication overhead, which are O(d2) ciphertexts, however the computation
complexity of this method is O(d3) which would take a long time when the matrix dimension d is
large. The optimization from Damg˚ard et al. [2012] and Liu et al. [2017] reduces the computation
complexity to O(d3/N) by using the CRT packing, at the cost of increasing the communication head
to O(d3) ciphertexts. In other words, the existing FHE methods for the functionality of Figure 5.1
stay in the two opposing extremes aspect to computation efficiency and communication efficiency.
In this chapter, we present a new protocol ΠSMP for computing multiplication of encrypted
matrices with a smaller communication and computation overhead. We achieve this via a brand
new packing which addresses the functionality of batch inner products of Figure 5.1. Specifically,
the computation complexity of ΠSMP is O(d3/`) homomorphic operations and the communication
complexity is O(d2/`) aspect to the matrix size d, which achieves a better balance between the
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Functionality Batch Inner Products Functionality FbIP
Inputs: ` > 0 pairs of vector (ai, bi)
`
i=1, where ai, bi ∈ Zdt for length d > 0.
Outputs: Inner products 〈ai, bi〉 ∈ Zt for 1 ≤ i ≤ `.
Figure 5.1: Batch Inner Product Functionality.
communication efficiency and the computation efficiency than the previous methods. As one of the
application of ΠSMP, we show how to improve the performance of two existing privacy-preserving
machine learning frameworks, i.e., SecureML [Mohassel and Zhang, 2017] and MiniONN [Liu et al.,
2017]. From empirical results, it shows that ΠSMP reduces about 92% communication bandwidth
of SecureML and about 95% communication bandwidth of MiniONN. More details on the privacy-
preserving machine learning are given in § 5.4.
5.2 Double Packing: New Message Packing for Batching In-
ner Products
From a high-level explanation, the double packing employs the forward-back packing (Equation 2.1)
to each plaintext slot of the CRT packing (Equation 2.2). One should recall that the CRT packing
introduces an isomorphic map
Zt[X]/(XN + 1) ∼=
∏`
k=1
Zt[X]/(Fk),
where the factor polynomial Fk is a degree-d polynomial andN = d·`. In other words, the polynomial
multiplication in each sub-field is over the modulo Fk. Without assuming the arrangement of Fks’
coefficients, we have the following theorem which is a natural extension of Theorem 1 to the CRT
packing.
Theorem 10. Presume integer vectors u,v ∈ Zδt . Let Fk be one of the degree-d factor polynomial
from the CRT-packing. If 0 < δ ≤ d/2, then the following holds.
Let P = pifwd(u)× pibwd(v) mod Fk. We have P [δ − 1] = 〈u,v〉 .
Proof. If the vector length δ ≤ d/2, then the degree of the product polynomial pifwd(u)× pibwd(v) is
less than d. As a result, taking modulo of the degree-d polynomial Fk does not change the correctness
of Theorem 1.
Theorem 10 simply implies that a batch of ` inner products of vectors of length d/2 can be
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Protocol (Basic) Batch Inner Product Protocol
Input of encryptor : Private vectors ai ∈ Zdt for 1 ≤ i ≤ `.
Input of evaluator : Private vectors bi ∈ Zdt for 1 ≤ i ≤ `.
Output of decryptor: : Inner products 〈ai, bi〉 mod t for 1 ≤ i ≤ `.
1. Encryption. The encryptor encrypts the elements of ai and sends d · ` ciphertexts to the
evaluator
{Enc (ai[k])}1≤i<`,1≤k<d.
2. Evaluation. The evaluator computes as follows.
(1) Computes the inner product via homomorphic operations For example, the j-th inner prod-
uct 〈aj , bj〉 is computed by
cj =
(
d⊕
k=1
Enc (ai[k])⊗ bj [k]
)
(2) Outputs ciphertexts {cj}`j=1.
3. Extraction. The decryptor decrypts cj and obtain 〈aj , bj〉 for 1 ≤ j ≤ `.
Figure 5.2: Basic Secure Batch Inner Products Protocol.
homomorphically computed via one homomorphic multiplication, resulting in one single ciphertext.
When using the double packing for secure matrix multiplication, say AB for |A| = n1 × n2 and
|B| = n2×n3, the encryptor will break down each row ofA into vectors with at most d/2 entries, and
encrypt ` vectors that picked from distinct row as one ciphertext. In total, the encryptor will send
n1/` ·2n2/d ≈ 2n1n2/N ciphertexts to the evaluator. To compute the matrix product, the evaluator
first breaks down each column vector ofB into vectors with at most d/2 entries, and encodes ` copies
of each shorter vector as one polynomial. Then, the evaluator can homomorphically compute the
matrix product via about 2n1n2n3/N operations, resulting in n1n3/` ciphertexts. In other words, by
applying Theorem 10, we can reduce the communication overhead of the basic protocol of Figure 5.2
by a factor of N/2, and reduce the computation overhead by a factor of N/2, too.
5.2.1 Double the Capacity of Double Packing
Using the optimization in the previous section, we can compute ` inner products of vectors with at
most d/2 entries. We now present a way to double this length from d/2 to d which helps reducing
half of the computation time and communication cost of our secure matrix product protocol. To do
so, we must find a such prime t that “shapes” all polynomials Fk into a specific form
Fk = X
d + βk s.t. βk 6= 0. (5.1)
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Table 5.1: Prime t that satisfies Equation 5.1 when N = 4096.
t 84961 82241 82561 70913 84481 87041
` 16 32 64 128 256 512
For example, polynomial X1024 +1 can be decomposed as (X256 +10)(X256 +41)(X256 +96)(X256 +
127) mod 137, that is m = 1024, d = 256, and t = 137. With such Fk’s, we can apply the forward-
backward trick to the plaintext slots with vectors of at most d entries. Empirically, we have found
many primes that satisfy this requirement. In Table 5.1, we present some examples of practical N
and ` for the matrix product functionality. Specifically, the underlying encryption scheme should
provide at least 80-bit security level when N = 4096, according to the security analysis from [Halevi
and Shoup, 2014].
Theorem 11. Suppose integer vectors u,v ∈ Zdt and βk 6= 0. Then the following holds.
Let P = pifwd(u)× pibwd(v) mod Xd + βk.We have P [d− 1] = 〈u,v〉 .
Proof. Before taking the modulo Xd+βk, the (d−1)-th coefficient of the product pifwd(u)×pibwd(v)
equals to 〈u,v〉, according to the forward-backward trick described in Theorem 1. In addition, the
degree of this polynomial is 2d − 2. Therefore, the (d − 1)-th coefficient remains unchanged, even
taking the modulo Xd + βk.
Theorem 11 implies that a batch of ` inner products of vectors of length d can be homomorphically
computed via one homomorphic multiplication, resulting in one single ciphertext if parameters N
and t are chosen properly. The number of encryptions performed by the encryptor is reduced from
2n1n2/N to n1n2/N , and the number of homomorphic operations operated by the evaluator is
reduced from 2n1n2n3/N to n1n2n3/N .
Finally, we write
→
piw and
←
piw : (Zdt )` 7→ At respectively denoting the double packing functions
→
piw(a0, . . . ,a`−1) := picrt(pifwd(a0), . . . , pifwd(a`−1))
←
piw(b0, . . . , b`−1) := picrt(pibwd(b0), . . . , pibwd(b`−1)).
The subscript ‘w’ means double packing. When vectors are packed in this way, we can compute the
functionality of Figure 5.1 via one single polynomial multiplication, i.e.,
pi−1w
(→
piw(a0, . . . ,a`−1)×←piw(b0, . . . , b`−1)
)
gives {〈ai, bi〉}`i=1
In the next section, we introduce how to efficiently unpack (i.e., pi−1w ) the double packed vectors.
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5.2.2 Efficient Double Unpacking
The double unpacking function is defined as pi−1w : At 7→ Z`q, which is used by the decryptor to
extract ` inner products after decrypting the ciphertexts received from the evaluator. Suppose the
polynomial A =
∑N−1
i=0 aiX
i is decrypted from one of the ciphertext that computed by the evaluator.
To extract ` inner products from A, mathematically, the decryptor must compute the (d − 1)-th
coefficient of A mod Fk for each modulo Fk = X
d + βk. This can be accomplished by using the
unpacking function of the CRT packing pi−1crt : take the modulo A mod Fk; then keep only the (d−1)-
th coefficient of the resulting polynomial and discard the remains. But the effort of computing the
discarded coefficients becomes meaningless.
We now present a faster implementation of pi−1w by examining the algebraic property
(−βk)t−1Xd−1 = Xtd−1 mod Xd + βk
for positive t > 0. This gives us a way to compute the (d − 1)-th coefficient of A mod Xd + βk
directly. Specifically, we compute the (d− 1)-th coefficient of A mod Xd + βk as follows
ad−1 + a2d−1(−βk) + · · ·+ a`d−1(−βk)`−1. (5.2)
Because βks are known during the key generation, the values (−βk)2, · · · , (−βk)`−1 can be computed
once and reused for many unpackings. For the case of secure matrix product, thousands of unpackings
is usually required, and thus Equation 5.2 can reduce the computation cost at the decryptor’s side
significantly. From our empirical results, pi−1w that uses Equation 5.2 was about 25 − 1000 times
faster than using pi−1crt directly.
5.3 Application: Communication Efficient Secure Matrix Mul-
tiplication
We now present our secure matrix product protocol ΠSMP in Figure 5.3 using the double packing.
It is noteworthy that we fix the matrix size of A to `× d and the size of B to d× ` for the sake of
simplicity. The protocol in Figure 5.3 can be easily extended for general size matrices, as described
later.
The matrix product AB is computed through inner products between the row vectors of A and
the column vectors of B. Specifically, the encryptor processes rows of A with
→
piw before doing
encryption in Step 2. This step produces one ciphertext ctx which is sent to the evaluator. In Step
2, the evaluator applies
←
piw to `-copies of each column of B, and then multiplies the packed copies
to ctx, resulting a ciphertext of one row of the product matrix. In Step 3, the decryptor decrypts
all the ciphertexts and uses pi−1w to obtain the result C. We now show that C = AB mod t.
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Protocol Secure Matrix Product Protocol ΠSMP
Remarks: Let sk be a private key and evk be the corresponding evaluation key of the underlying
homomorphic encryption scheme. The decryptor holds the private key sk.
Input of encryptor: private matrix A ∈ Z`×dt
Input of evaluator: private matrix B ∈ Zd×`t
Output of decryptor: the matrix product AB ∈ Z`×`t
Encryptor:
1. The encryptor processes rows of A with the double packing and sends the ciphertext
ctx = Enc
(→
piw (A[0, :], . . . ,A[`− 1, :])
)
to the decryptor, attached with its evaluation key evk.
Evaluator:
2. For each column B[:, j], the evaluator computes a ciphertext
ctxj = ctx⊗←piw(B[:, j],B[:, j], . . . ,B[:, j]︸ ︷︷ ︸
`-copies
)⊕ picrt([Rj,1, Rj,2, · · · , Rj,`])
where polynomials Rj,k U←− Zt[X]/(Fk) and the d-th coefficients are set as zero, i.e., Rj,k[d−1] = 0
for 1 ≤ k ≤ `. The evaluator sends back ` ciphertexts {ctxj}j∈[`] to the decryptor.
Decryptor:
3. The decryptor firstly sets C ∈ Z`×`t as a zero matrix. For each ctxj , the decryptor decrypts it
and uses pi−1w presented in § 5.2.2 to extract ` values, which are placed in the j-th row of C.
4. The decryptor outputs C.
Figure 5.3: Communication Efficient Secure Matrix Product Protocol ΠSMP.
Theorem 12. The protocol of Figure 5.3 computes privately the matrix product functionality, i.e,.
AB under the semi-honest setting.
Proof. (Correctness) In Step 1, the encryptor processes the rows of A with
→
piw. According to
Theorem 11, ctxj of Step 2 gives the inner products between the rows of A and j-th column of B,
which forms the j-th row of AB. By iterating all columns of B, the matrix product AB is then
encrypted in ciphertexts {ctxj}j∈[`]. Thus we have C = AB mod t.
Proof. (Privacy.) Security Against a Semi-Honest Evaluator. We first prove security against
a semi-honest evaluator. Given the fact that, the evaluator’s view during the protocol execution
consists only of ciphertexts, and thus the security against a semi-honest evaluator can be reduced
to the semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme.
Security Against a Semi-Honest Decryptor. Next, we prove security against a semi-honest
decryptor. The view of the decryptor during the real execution consists of `2 independent polyno-
mials with coefficients (except the d-th coefficient which is the inner product) distributed uniformly
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Table 5.2: Comparing the computation complexity of three HE-based methods. n indicates the
matrix dimension. N and ` are parameters of the underlying RLWE-based encryption scheme.
Method Encryptor Evaluator Decryptor
Mohassel and Zhang [2017] (AHE-based) O(n2) O(n3) O(n2)
Liu et al. [2017] (RLWE-based) O(n2/N) O(n3/N) O(n3/N)
Ours (RLWE-basd) O(n2/`) O(n3/N) O(n2/`)
over Zt due to the random polynomials Rj,k used in Step 2 of Figure 5.3. Thereby, we can simply
construct a simulator for the view of the decryptor during the real execution by sampling uniform
random polynomials from At.
General Case and Complexity Analysis. For the case of general matrices, A and B can be
partitioned into block matrices {Aik} and {Bkj} where the size of Aik is ` × d and the size of
Bkj is d × `. Zero-padding might be used to align the size. Now, the encryptor must process
each block Aik in Step 1. Then AB is computed through a summation of products of the block
matrices, i.e.,
∑
kAikBkj . The block-matrix product AikBkj is computed in Step 2 of Figure 5.3,
and the summation can be accomplished from homomorphic additions. Thus, the correctness of
Theorem 12 follows. Furthermore, no extra interaction between the protocol players is introduced.
Therefore, the privacy of Theorem 12 follows, too.
In total, the encryptor processes O(n1n2/N) blocks. The evaluator operates O(n1n2n3/N) ho-
momorphic multiplications and additions, resulting O(n1n3/`) ciphertexts which will be transferred
to the decryptor. In Table 5.2, we summarize and compare the complexity of our method with other
homomorphic encryption-based methods. Although the computational complexity of our method
are in the same order with the AHE-based method of SecureML [Mohassel and Zhang, 2017] our
method can provide a considerable acceleration given the fact that m is usually a large value, e.g.,
N ≥ 212. Suppose n1, n2, and n3 = 128 and N = 212. For our method, the server only operate 512
homomorphic operations as opposed to the 2.0 × 106 homomorphic operations of the AHE-based
method.
Special Case: Matrix–Vector Product. When n1 = 1 (i.e., A becomes a single row matrix),
the matrix product AB can be specially regarded as the matrix–vector product. The algorithm of
Figure 5.3 does cover this special case by zero-padding A, although with a small modification, the
complexity of the algorithm can be improved in this setting. That is, in Step 1 of Figure 5.3, the
encryptor sends a ciphertext of `-copies of A, ctx = Enc
((→
piw(A[0, :], . . . ,A[0, :])
))
. In Step 2, the
evaluator operates the homomorphic multiplication with ` columns of B instead of just one, i.e.,
ctx0 = ctx⊗ piw(B[:, 0],B[:, 1], . . . ,B[:, `− 1]).
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Table 5.3: Speedup of the unpacking pi−1w due to the pre-computation from Equation 5.2. The RLWE
parameters N and t follow Table 5.1.
#slots `
c4.x8large Raspberry Pi
with w/o with w/o
pre-comp. pre-comp. pre-comp. pre-comp.
16 0.008 ms 31.1 ms 0.360 ms 549 ms
64 0.032 ms 33.2 ms 1.33 ms 573 ms
128 0.120 ms 33.3 ms 5.03 ms 612 ms
256 0.437 ms 36.3 ms 21.9 ms 694 ms
512 1.68 ms 41.6 ms 99.9 ms 853 ms
Table 5.4: Micro-benchmarks of ΠSMP using one single access. The performance numbers were
averaged from 50 runs. m and ` are parameters of the underlying encryption scheme, and κ denotes
the security level.
(m, `, κ) n1 × n3 →piw ENC EVA DEC pi−1w
Total Time (sec) Communication
LAN WAN encryptor decryptor
(4
0
9
6
,1
2
8
,8
0
)
1282 27.9 ms 16.1 ms 205 ms 233 ms 28.9 ms 2.45 3.30 0.25 MB 8 MB
2562 43.8 ms 26.2 ms 670 ms 744 ms 83.8 ms 7.25 8.22 0.5 MB 32 MB
5122 81.1 ms 44.9 ms 2.63 sec 2.82 sec 299 ms 26.4 27.7 1.0 MB 128 MB
(8
1
9
2
,2
5
6
,3
0
0
)
2562 67.9 ms 31.8 ms 614 ms 770 ms 197 ms 9.37 10.7 0.5 MB 32 MB
5122 108 ms 48.4 ms 2.46 sec 2.88 sec 720 ms 29.1 30.4 1.0 MB 128 MB
10242 140 ms 75.9 ms 9.80 sec 11.0 sec 2.81 sec 65.4 110 2.0 MB 512 MB
The remaining steps of the algorithm follows. In this case, the evaluator performs O(n2n3/N)
homomorphic operations, and transfers O(n3/`) ciphertexts to the decryptor.
5.3.1 Evaluations
Implementations. We implemented ΠSMP using HElib [Halevi and Shoup, 2017]. The parameters
N = 4096 and t = 70913 were used to provide ` = 128 slots. The other parameters of HElib were
set properly to provide at least κ = 80-bit security level. A single ciphertext under this setting was
about 64 kilobytes. Additionally, N = 8192 and t = 84481, which can provide at least κ = 300-bit
security level, were also used in the micro-benchmarks of ΠSMP (Table 5.4).
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We compared ΠSMP with three existing methods, including the OT-based method, the AHE-
based method from SecureML and the RLWE-based method from MiniONN. Specifically, we used
the EMP-toolkit [Wang et al., 2016a] to implement the OT-based method of SecureML, using 16-
bit inputs for a fair comparison because log2 t ≈ 16. For the AHE-based method, we instantiated
the AHE with the DGK scheme [Damg˚ard et al., 2009] with a 1024-bit RSA modulus using the
implementation from [Demmler et al., 2015]. For the method of MiniONN, we used the HElib and
parameters were set as N = 4096 and t = 65537, aiming to provide ` = 4096 plaintext slots.
Computation and Communication Environments. We conducted extensive experiments using
a various types of computing machines and under two network settings.
• Evaluator specifications. We used one AWS c5.18xlarge instance of 72 virtual CPUs (vCPUs)
@3.00 GHz and 25 Gbps outgoing bandwidth as the evaluator node.
• Encrytor & Decryptor specifications. The encryptor’ requests were equally launched from five
AWS c4.8xlarge instances of 36 vCPUs @2.90 GHz for each instance. Also, we ran experiments
on a weak device, i.e., Raspberry Pi model B v1.2 of one CPU @900 MHz.
• LAN setting. For the LAN setting, all the AWS instances were launched inside the same
region. The ping delay was about 2.5 ms.
• WAN setting. For the WAN setting, the evaluator instance was launched in west US and the
encryptor instances were launched in east Asia. The bandwidth was about 114 Mbps with
about 110 ms ping delay.
Measurements. We measured the end-to-end running time of these matrix product protocols using
a high resolution clock (i.e., the standard chrono library). For the OT-based method, the time for
computing the OT-extension [Asharov et al., 2013] is included. For ΠSMP, the computing time of
Equation 5.2 is included while the key generation time is excluded. We also measured the total
amount of data transferred by each method. Moreover, we provide five more micro-benchmarks
of ΠSMP. That is, the computation time of packing
→
piw, encryption (ENC), decryption (DEC),
and unpacking pi−1w on the encryptor and decryptor’s side, and the evaluation (EVA) time on the
evaluator’s side.
5.3.2 Evaluation Results: Faster Unpacking Optimization
We can instantiate the double unpacking function pi−1w using the unpacking function pi
−1
crt , but this will
introduce an expensive computation at the client’s side. In § 5.2.2, we present to use a pre-computed
table to eliminate the needs of pi−1crt . Experiment results (Table 5.3) show that this optimization can
significantly reduce the computation burden of the client. This experiment was conducted on two
devices, the powerful AWS instance and the much weaker Raspberry Pi. We can see that the
unpacking pi−1w from using Equation 5.2 was much faster than using pi
−1
crt .
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Table 5.5: Comparing the performances of ΠSMP with the AHE-based method and the OT-based
method from SecureML [Mohassel and Zhang, 2017], and the RLWE-based method from Min-
iONN [Liu et al., 2017], under LAN and WAN, respectively.
Dimension
Method
MT Generation Time (LAN/WAN)
Communication
n1, n2, n3 1 encryptor 10 encryptors 50 encryptors
12
8
,1
2
8
,1
2
8 AHE 26.3 sec/26.9 sec 26.1 sec/26.7 sec 33.2 sec/33.0 sec 3.98 MB
OT 4.07 sec/60.8 sec 140 sec/168 sec 389 sec/485 sec 432 MB
RLWE 123 sec/124 sec 123 sec/127 sec 146 sec/151 sec 32.3 MB
Ours 2.49 sec/3.26 sec 2.54 sec/3.35 sec 3.53 sec/3.36 sec 8.25 MB
25
6
,1
28
,2
5
6 AHE 95.1 sec/95.3 sec 94.6 sec/95.0 sec 122 sec/123 sec 11.9 MB
OT 16.1 sec/235 sec 588 sec/656 sec 0.426 hr/0.472 hr 1664 MB
RLWE 486 sec/489 sec 495 sec/498 sec 545 sec/545 sec 129 MB
Ours 7.38 sec/8.21 sec 7.41 sec/8.63 sec 10.8 sec/11.0 sec 32.5 MB
51
2
,1
28
,5
12 AHE 361 sec/361 sec 356 sec/359 sec 507 sec/510 sec 39.8 MB
OT 57.5 sec/917 sec 0.723 hr/0.732 hr 1.59 hr/1.82 hr 6520 MB
RLWE 0.522 hr/0.538 hr 0.556 hr/0.574 hr 0.560 hr/0.570 hr 513 MB
Ours 26.6 sec/27.5 sec 26.8 sec/29.1 sec 41.2 sec/41.4 sec 129 MB
5.3.3 Evaluation Results: Micro-benchmarks
The micro-benchmarks of ΠSMP is given in Table 5.4. Additionally, we used a higher security level
κ = 160 in this experiment to demonstrate its performance growth with respect to κ. By the virtue
of our new packing method and its extension, the computation on the evaluator’ side (i.e., the EVA
column) was very fast.
5.3.4 Evaluation Results: Comparison to Other Matrix Product Methods
The comparison results to the existing secure matrix product methods are given in Table 6.1. From
Table 6.1, we know that ΠSMP outperformed these methods in terms of computation time, especially
when many encryptors access to the evaluator concurrently.
For the AHE-based method, the evaluator needs to operate n1n2n3 homomorphic operations
while our method requires only n1n2n3/m homomorphic operations. Since the parameter m of the
underlying encryption scheme is usually large, e.g., m ≥ 212, our method can provide a considerable
boost, e.g., it was about 8−12 times faster than the AHE-based method according to our benchmarks.
Although the consumed network traffic of ΠSMP was 2− 3 times larger than that of the AHE-based
method, the absolute amount of the network traffic was still small enough to be transferred through
a narrow bandwidth within a reasonable time.
Comparing to the OT-based method, ΠSMP only exchanged about 1.9% of data of the OT-based
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Figure 5.4: Cumulative histograms of the performances of ΠSMP and the AHE-based method of [Mo-
hassel and Zhang, 2017] under 50, 100, 500, and 1000 concurrent accesses. The size of matrices was
128× 128.
method. As a result, when many clients access to the evaluator concurrently, the running time of
ΠSMP was much faster than the OT-based method, e.g., about 66−97 times faster when the number
of concurrent accesses was 10. Moreover, the performance of our method was less sensitive to the
network latency than the OT-based method. That is because our method is a single-round protocol
while the OT-based method requires multiple rounds of communication between the encryptor and
the evaluator.
5.3.5 Evaluation Results: One Thousand Concurrent Accesses and Con-
strained Devices
To show the feasibility of using the proposed method under the high concurrency setting, we bench-
marked ΠSMP with more concurrent accesses under the LAN setting. Specifically, for each of the
five AWS c4.8xlarge instances, we launched 10, 20, 100, and 200 MT generation requests to the
server instance, and recorded the total running time for each request. In the other words, the server
instance handled concurrent accesses of 50, 100, 500 and 1000 using its 72 vCPUs. We only compare
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with the AHE-based method of Mohassel and Zhang [2017] because of the OT-based method and
the SwHE-based method would take too much time under the high concurrency setting. The results
are shown in Figure 5.4 The server handled 100 concurrent accesses within 10 seconds (that is, the
2-rd plot of Figure 5.4). Therefore, if we want to handle 1000 concurrent accesses within 10 seconds,
we need about 10 server nodes.
We also ran the secure matrix multiplication protocols on a much more weaker device, i.e., the
Raspberry Pi. However we failed to compile the OT library [Wang et al., 2016a] on the Raspberry
Pi. Therefore, only the homomorphic encryption-based methods were considered in this experiment.
Matrices of size 128× 128 were used. The total running times are as follows.
• Ours: 16.2 seconds.
• AHE-based method of Mohassel and Zhang [2017]: 389 seconds.
• RLWE-based method of Liu et al. [2017]: more than 23 minutes.
We can see that our method can perform better than the existing HE-based methods on resource
constrained devices.
5.4 Application: Privacy-preserving Machine Learning
Machine learning is becoming ubiquitous. More and more machine learning-based online services,
such as shopping recommendation [Nikolaenko et al., 2013], traffic-aware navigation [Wu et al., 2016],
medical diagnosis [Singh and Guttag, 2011], and face recognition [Erkin et al., 2009], are reachable
by thousands of clients. One important feature of these online services is high concurrency. That
is, there might be thousands of clients using the services simultaneously. Suppose a traffic-aware
navigation service is running in a metropolitan area, e.g., Tokyo and New York. The number of
clients using the navigation service can be numerous during the peak time. Thus, the machine
learning-based service should be scalable under this highly concurrent setting. Moreover, clients of
these online services are usually equipped with limited computing resources. Take the navigation
service as the example again; the client might connect to the navigation service via his/her cell
phone or through on-vehicle devices. Therefore, the machine learning-based service should avoid
introducing heavy computations at the client’s side.
To use a machine learning-based online service, a client must reveal his/her data to the server.
When the data involves sensitive information of the client, such as locations, shopping logs and
medical records, revealing these data to the server might raise potential risks of compromising
client’s privacy, such as data breaches. A natural question here is whether one can use the machine
learning-based online services and still maintain the privacy of client’s data?
One solution is to use secure two-party computation (2PC) techniques [Goldwasser and Micali,
1982, Yao, 1982]. 2PC allows two parties (e.g., the client and the server) to jointly compute a
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function on their private inputs, learning only the output of the function. In the context of the
privacy-preserving machine learning, one of the most fundamental components is a practical secure
matrix multiplication protocol, since computing the product of matrices is the essential operation of
many popularly used machine learning algorithms such as linear regression [Lu et al., 2017, Gasco´n
et al., 2017], logistic regression [Wang et al., 2016b] and neural networks [Liu et al., 2017, Riazi
et al., 2018].
Based on the discussions above, the main objective of this work is to develop a practical secure
matrix multiplication protocol that can run fast under the following (realistic) situations.
1. High Concurrency. There can be thousands of clients continuously and concurrently access
to the server while the outgoing and incoming bandwidth of the server and clients are bounded,
e.g., 20 Gbps and 100 Mbps, respectively. In other words, the server can only allocate a small
ratio of its bandwidth for each client.
2. Weak Client. The computing resources at the client’s side might be constrained. For exam-
ple, the computing power of the autonomous vehicles and the Internet of Things (IoT) devices
are usually limited, e.g., one 1.0 - 2.0 GHz CPU chip.
5.4.1 Related Work and Challenges
Recent improvements and optimizations to 2PC, such as Brakerski et al. [2012], Damg˚ard et al.
[2012], Asharov et al. [2013], Demmler et al. [2015], Mohassel and Zhang [2017], Huang et al. [August
8-12, 2011], Wang et al. [2016a], Liu et al. [2015], Songhori et al. [2015] to name a few, enable efficient
secure matrix multiplication protocols. Specifically, we can separate a secure multiplication protocol
into two stages: an oﬄine stage and an online stage. The computation during the oﬄine stage is
input-independent, that is the client and the server do not need to provide any private data in this
stage. They jointly compute some (one-time use) auxiliary data, i.e., Beaver’s multiplication triples
(MTs) Beaver [1995], so that the evaluation of the online stage can be significantly accelerated using
MTs.
Beaver’s MT is one of the most efficient way to perform secure matrix multiplication which has
been applied to many 2PC frameworks such as SPDZ [Damg˚ard et al., 2012], ABY [Demmler et al.,
2015], SecureML [Mohassel and Zhang, 2017] and MiniONN [Liu et al., 2017]. Many optimizations
are proposed to improve the MT generation (i.e., the performance in the oﬄine stage) in these
frameworks. Specifically, ABY and SecureML suggest to use a vectorization technique and propose
a variant type of MT which is specialized for secure dot product. Then, secure matrix multiplication
can be computed by the iterations of secure dot products. They present two concrete solutions from
oblivious transfer (OT) and additively homomorphic encryption (AHE), respectively. On the other
hand, SPDZ and MiniONN propose another optimization from a RLWE-based homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme [Brakerski et al., 2012, Chen et al., 2017] and the message packing technique [Smart
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Figure 5.5: Left: Running time for generating MTs for multiplying matrices of 128 × 128 entries
using the OT-based method of Mohassel and Zhang [2017] under a 25 Gbps outgoing bandwidth.
Right: Running time of our method under the same setting.
and Vercauteren, 2014]. Specifically, a batch of ` > 0 integers are encrypted as a single ciphertext
where ` is a parameter related to the RLWE-based scheme. Then, the homomorphic multiplication
will be carried out to the packed ` integers simultaneously.
The secure matrix multiplication protocol can also be constructed from tools such as Yao’s
garbled circuit [Yao, 1982, Kolesnikov and Schneider, 2008, Zahur et al., 2015, Nikolaenko et al.,
2013] and garbled arithmetic circuit [Applebaum et al., 2011]. However, such generic tools also
require a wide bandwidth as the OT-based methods. Other ad hoc methods [Mishra et al., 2017,
Duong et al., 2016] are efficient regarding computation time but the matrix size is constrained, e.g.,
smaller than 16×16, which might not be sufficient for modern machine learning algorithms like deep
neural networks.
Challenges. Suppose the client and the server evaluate a secure matrix multiplication with private
matrices of n dimension of t-bits integers using the existing methods [Demmler et al., 2015, Mohassel
and Zhang, 2017, Damg˚ard et al., 2012, Liu et al., 2017]. We now show that these methods might
not scale well under the high concurrency and weak client situations.
For the OT-based method of [Demmler et al., 2015, Mohassel and Zhang, 2017], the client and the
server need to perform O(n3t) instances of correlated OT [Asharov et al., 2013], which is lightweight
in terms of computation. However, when many clients access to the server concurrently, these OT-
based methods will take a considerably longer time, since the bandwidth allocated for each user is
eventually bounded. Figure 5.5 gives an example of using the OT-based method of [Mohassel and
Zhang, 2017] to generate MTs for secure matrix multiplication of two 128 × 128 matrices. In this
experiment, the outgoing bandwidth on the server’s side was about 25 Gbps. When the number
of concurrent accesses was small, e.g., 1 − 2, clients only need to wait less than 5 seconds. As the
number of concurrent accesses increases, the waiting time becomes significantly longer. In other
words, if the server wants to handle 1000 concurrent accesses within 5 seconds, it might need to
prepare more than 25000 Gbps outgoing bandwidth, which seems unrealistic for the current Internet.
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Table 5.6: Using ΠSMP to improve the pre-computation stage of SecureML. The mini-batch size B
was fixed as 128 as SecureML. The performance numbers of the methods of SecureML are taken
from their paper Mohassel and Zhang [2017].
N,D, t Method Time (LAN/WAN) Commu.
104, 100, 156
AHE 248.4 sec/252.9 sec 20 MB
OT 7.9 sec/420.2 sec 1.9 GB
Ours 23.4 sec/30.2 sec 159 MB
105, 100, 1563
AHE 2437.1 sec/2478.1 sec 200 MB
OT 88.0 sec/4125.1 sec 19 GB
Ours 168 sec/187 sec 785 MB
For the RLWE-based method of [Liu et al., 2017], the client and the server exchange O(n3/`)
RLWE ciphertexts through the network. This method can consume less bandwidth than the OT-
based solutions because of the packing technique allows embedding a large number of plaintext
values into a single ciphertext, such as ` = 212. However, this method requires the client to perform
O(n3/`) unpackings, which can be extremely expensive for a weak client. For instance, in our
benchmarks, it took a Raspberry Pi more than 23 minutes to perform the unpacking when n = 128
and ` = 212. Even for a powerful AWS instance, this computation still took more than 2 minutes.
For the AHE-based method of [Demmler et al., 2015, Mohassel and Zhang, 2017], the client
and the server exchange O(n2) AHE ciphertexts. The client needs to perform O(n2) decryptions,
and no unpacking is needed. It seems that the AHE-based method is the best under our situations.
However, the server needs to operate O(n3) public key operations which can become the performance
bottleneck when n is large. For instance, when n = 512, the client would need to wait more than 6
minutes before the server completes the secure matrix multiplication.
5.4.2 Application to Private Machine Learning Model Training
SecureML is a secure computation framework that is originally designed for training machine learning
models from a dataset that is already shared additively between two collusion-free servers. The
private model training is performed between the two collusion-free servers using OT-based secure
matrix multiplication protocol, and other cryptographic tools such as Yao’s garbled circuit Yao
[1982], Wang et al. [2016a].
Specifically, SecureML uses the mini-batch stochastic gradient descent (SGD) of a batch size
B > 0 to train their models from a dataset X ∈ ZN×D within t steps. Here, N indicates the
number of data points in the dataset and D indicates the number of features. As suggested by
SecureML, when using SGD for some classes of machine learning algorithms, e.g., linear regression
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Table 5.7: Using ΠSMP to improve the pre-computation stage of MiniONN. The performance numbers
of the method of MiniONN are taken from their paper Liu et al. [2017].
(a) The matrix products involved in NN-CIFAR.
Layer 1 3 6 8
A 1024× 27 1024× 576 256× 576 256× 576
B 27× 64 576× 64 576× 64 576× 64
Layer 11 13 15 17
A 64× 576 64× 64 64× 64 1× 1024
B 576× 64 64× 64 64× 16 1024× 10
(b) Performances under a single access.
Method Time (LAN/WAN) Communication
MiniONN 472 sec/ – 3046 MB
Ours 24.5 sec/26.6 sec 137 MB
and logistic regression, the SGD computation involves a matrix product UV , where the size of U
is B ×D and the size of V is D × t. The value of B is usually a few hundreds, e.g., B = 128 as in
SecureML, and the value of t is usually set such that Bt > N .
We now show that ΠSMP can be a better alternative for performing secure matrix multiplication in
SecureML, especially under the high concurrency setting. Specifically, we compared the computation
time and communication cost with the performance numbers presented in their paper Mohassel and
Zhang [2017]. Notice that, 64-bit inputs were used in SecureML while the plaintext precision of our
encryption scheme was log2 t ≈ 16. To have a fair comparison, we use the techniques of [Lu et al.,
2017] to achieve the same level of 64-bits precision. The comparison details are given in Table 5.6.
It is apparent that our method is more efficient, especially when the matrix size is large and the
number of concurrent accesses is more than one. Specifically, our method was about 3 − 21 times
faster than the AHE-based method when the matrix size was 100× 1563. Also, it was 5− 35 times
faster than the OT-based method and consumed only about 4.0%− 5.3% of the OT-based method.
5.4.3 Application to Private Deep Neural Networks Evaluation
The recent explosive evolution of neural network research has led to breakthroughs in many machine
learning tasks. The application area covers not only image and speech recognition but also diverse
types of predictive and cognitive modeling. The unprecedented accuracy of deep learning models
enables various novel services that might have marked effects on our society, for example, human
virus detection [Brion et al., 2005], and drug discovery [Baskin et al., 2016].
The private neural network evaluation framework, i.e., MiniONN, is proposed by Liu et al.
[2017], which apply the CRT packing technique to speed up the server’s computation time, at the
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Table 5.8: Neural Network Description. c′ indicates the number of channels, h is the size of filters
and s is the stride size. ρ is the pooling size.
Layer Output Size Activation Note
Input 32× 32× 3 - RGB image
Conv-1 30× 30× 32 ReLU c′ = 32, h = 3, s = 1
Conv-2 28× 28× 32 ReLU c′ = 32, h = 3, s = 1
MaxPool-1 14× 14× 32 - ρ = 2
Conv-3 13× 13× 64 ReLU c′ = 64, h = 2, s = 1
Conv-4 12× 12× 64 ReLU c′ = 64, h = 2, s = 1
MaxPool-2 6× 6× 64 - ρ = 2
FC-1 512× 1 ReLU 2304× 512
FC-2 10× 1 Softmax 512× 10
cost increasing the communication overhead and the computation overhead of the client. More
specifically, in the protocol of Liu et al. [2017], the server transfers a cubic number of ciphertexts to
the client. For example, the protocol of Liu et al. [2017] requires the client to transfer more than 9
GB data to evaluate a middle-sized convolution network (i.e., achieving about 81% test accuracy on
the CIFAR-10 dataset). Also, the client might need to perform many decryption to obtain the final
result, which is expensive especially for clients of constrained bandwidth and computing power.
We experimentally show that ΠSMP is a more practical option for MiniONN to perform secure
matrix multiplication. Specifically, we take the 17-layer neural network from MiniONN as an ex-
ample. This network was originally designed for classifying the CIFAR-10 dataset [Krizhevsky and
Hinton, 2009], and thus we designate it as NN-CIFAR. In Table 5.7, we list up all the matrix prod-
ucts involved in NN-CIFAR where the matrix A is the private input from the client and B is the
private input from the serverr. We compared the computation time and communication cost of our
protocol with MiniONN. The comparison details are shown in 5.7b. It is apparent that ΠSMP con-
siderably reduced the computation time and the communication cost of the pre-computation stage
of MiniONN for evaluating NN-CIFAR, i.e., saving more than 95% of the computation time and
communication cost.
5.4.4 Concret Example of Private Deep Neural Networks Evaluation
To demonstrate the practicality of our ΠSMP, we conduct experiments with a ten-layer nonlinear
CNN model (Table 5.8) which can provide about 82.8% accuracy for the CIFAR-10 dataset. The
linear transforms (i.e., convolution and fully connected layers) are computed via our ΠSMP protocol,
and the non-linear parts are turned to garbled circuit.
Some Optimizations for Nonlinear Operations. In the some typical deep neural network
architecture, max pooling follows after an activation, that is, ReLU in the network of Table 5.8. We
note that the computation result is unchanged no matter we do the ReLU first or do the max pooling
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Table 5.9: Experimental results of our private CNN evaluation protocol. The evaluation time
includes the computation time and the communication time.
Layer Evaluation (ms)
Communication (MB)
client → server server → client
Conv-1 339± 2.88 15.08 2.23
ReLU 13678± 335.64 23.52 78.96
Conv-2 3464± 38.34 160.48 2.23
ReLUPool 9218± 32.29 12.12 58.07
Conv-3 2355± 14.75 71.47 1.12
ReLU 6015± 175.55 9.60 32.22
Conv-4 4672± 34.05 142.95 1.12
ReLUPool 3395± 100.86 3.88 18.59
FC-1 4152± 2.77 4.47 10.05
ReLU 524± 13.12 0.41 1.37
FC-2 763± 0.53 0.56 2.23
Total 48575± 750.78 444.54 208.19
first, that is, Pool(ReLU(T ), ρ) = ReLU(Pool(T , ρ)) holds. However, the computation complexity of
the first one is larger than that of the second one. From a simple calculation, we can know the
computation complexity is 2n′2 and n′2 + n′2/ρ2, respectively. Moreover, both ReLU and max
pooling require the max operation only. This motivates us to evaluate ReLU(Pool(·)) by combining
the ReLU operation with the following max pooling operation (if exist).
The experimental results are shown in Table 5.9. From the results, we can see that we can
privately evaluate a deep neural network within a reasonable time and communication overhead.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented ΠSMP for computing the multiplication of two matrices efficiently.
ΠSMP is built from ring-based homomorphic encryption with three algorithmic and implementation
optimizations. Our optimizations significantly reduce the computation time, both at the severs side
and at the client’s side. Moreover, the communication cost of our method is considerably less than
the existing OT-based methods. According to our experimental results, ΠSMP outperformed the
existing methods under the high concurrency setting. We also applied ΠSMP to two frameworks of
privacy-preserving machine learning, i.e., SecureML and MiniONN. The experimental results showed
that ΠSMP can reduce MT generation time of these frameworks by more than 74%− 97%. With the
combination of ΠSMP and garbled circuit, we also show that we can privately evaluate a ten-layers
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CNN within one minute with a reasonable communication overhead. In concluding, we consider that
ΠSMP can help forwarding the deployment of more practical and usable secure two-party computation
to machine learning-based online applications.
Chapter 6
Non-interactive and Expressive
Comparison
We have presented protocols for the inner product which are a linear function of the input while
for some algorithms, e.g., decision tree and support vector machine, the comparison (which is a
non-linear function) are also used. The protocol ΠbGT described in the previous chapter is efficient
for comparing two encrypted integers, but it provides a very limited ability to perform further
computation on the comparison bits. For example, given the ciphertexts of two encrypted vectors,
we can not use ΠbGT to compute how many elements in the first vector is larger than the elements
in the second vector. For this purpose, we present another comparison protocol oGT (Figure 6.1)
which can provide more expressiveness. As one of the possible application of oGT, we present the
first non-interactive privacy-preserving decision tree evaluation protocol in the following section.
We first describe the basic idea behind Figure 6.1. The message space of FHE is a polynomial
ring, and thus we can put integers in the coefficient or the degree of the polynomials. In oGT, we
encode 0 ≤ a, b < N in the degree of the polynomials. Remember that N is the parameter of the
underlying FHE scheme which is usually set as a few thousands, e.g., N ≤ 213. Specifically, we use
the encoding pi : Z 7→ At, given by pi(a) = Xa. The core idea behind oGT is to use the polynomial
C0 = T0 × pi(a)× pi(−b) mod (XN + 1), (6.1)
where T0 = 1+X+ · · ·+XN−1. Notice that the polynomial with a negative degree X−b is equivalent
to −XN−b modulo XN + 1. We argue that the 0-th coefficient C0[0] ∈ {1,−1}. When a ≤ b, C0[0]
comes from T0[b − a], and thus C0[0] = 1. On the other hand, when a > b, C0[0] comes from the
(m − (a − b))-th coefficient of T0, but in this case C0[0] = −1 due to the degree wrap around, i.e.,
XN−(a−b) ×Xa−b = −1 mod XN + 1. In other words, C0[0] = 1 if a ≤ b, else C0[0] = −1.
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Protocol Output Expressive Greater-than oGT
Input: Ciphertexts Enc (Xa), Enc
(
Xb
)
where a, b ∈ ZN where N is one of the FHE parameter.
Output: Enc (C), i.e., the ciphertext of a polynomial C ∈ At.
Remark: One can learn I{a > b} from the first coefficient of C, i.e., I{a > b} = C[0].
1. Compute µ¯ = 2−1 mod t and µ = −µ¯ mod t
2. Set the polynomial T = µ+ µX + · · ·+ µXm−1
3. Sample polynomial R U←− At and set R[0] = µ¯
4. Negate the degree homomorphically Enc
(
X−b
)← Enc (Xb)
5. Compute and output Enc (C) = Enc (Xa)⊗ Enc (X−b)⊗ T ⊕R
Figure 6.1: Output Expressive Greater-than
Theorem 13. (Correctness.) The protocol of Figure 6.1 correctly implements the greater-than
functionality I{a > b}.
Proof. We consider when a ≤ b. In this case, we have exactly one term, i.e., µXb−a of T which leads
the 0-th coefficient of the polynomial (Xa×X−b×T ) being µ. As a result, C[0] = µ+R[0] = µ+µ¯ = 0.
On the opposite side, we consider the case a > b. In this case, this coefficient becomes −µ because
µXm = −µ mod Xm + 1. As a result C[0] = −µ + R[0] which equals to 2µ¯ = 1. This completes
our proof that C[0] = I{a > b}.
Indeed, Step 4 of Figure 6.1 can be avoided if encryptor sends four ciphertexts {Enc (Xa) ,Enc (X−a)}
and {Enc (Xb) ,Enc (X−b)} to the evaluator. However, this doubles encryptor’s computation and
communication overhead. We now present a way that allows the evaluator to homomorphically
compute Enc
(
X−b
)
from Enc
(
Xb
)
. We achieve this negate step by applying homomorphically the
automorphism map M : X 7→ X2m−1
M(Xb) = X2mb−b = (−1)2b︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
·X−b mod Xm + 1.
This automorphism is possible on the FHE ciphertext since 2m − 1 ∈ Z∗2m which introduces one
extra key switching matrix into the public key. We refer to [Halevi and Shoup, 2014, Gentry et al.,
2012c] for more details about the automorphism on FHE ciphertexts.
6.1 Preserving Homomorphism
Arithmetic addition and multiplication are still possible on the output ciphertexts of oGT. To
be precise, the resulting ciphertext from oGT encrypts a polynomial of the form C = I{a >
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b} + ∑N−1j=1 rjXj where rjs’ are randomly generated integers. We can homomorphically sum the
outputs from several calls of oGT. For example, from the decryption of oGT(Enc (Xa) ,Enc
(
Xb1
)
)⊕
oGT(Enc (Xa) ,Enc
(
Xb2
)
), we can know I{a > b1}+ I{a > b2}.
For the multiplication, we require some constraints. If we operate oGT(Enc (Xa) ,Enc
(
Xb1
)
) ⊗
oGT(Enc (Xa) ,Enc
(
Xb2
)
), we can not obtain any meaningful result due to the random coefficients
introduced in oGT. In other words, we can not multiply the outputs from several calls of oGT directly.
On the other hand, we can only multiply the encryption of an integer e ∈ Zp to the encrypted result
of oGT, giving a ciphertext Enc (e · C). Thereby, after the decryption, we can obtain a meaningful
result e · I{a > b} from the 0-th coefficient.
6.2 Feasible Domain Extension
By exploiting the polynomial structure, our protocol can efficiently compare two encrypted integers.
However, the feasible input domain of oGT is relatively small, that is ZN , and this is the major
limitation of oGT. We now present a method to expand the feasible domain of oGT to ZN2 while
the non-interactive and output expressive properties of oGT remain unchanged.
Our idea is very simple, that is to separately compare each digit of the inputs, from the most
significant digit down to the least significant one. More precisely, an integer a′ ∈ ZN2 is partitioned
into two digits 0 ≤ a′1, a′0 < N such that a′ = a′1 ·N + a′0. We can see that I{a′ > b′} is equivalent
to
I{a′1 6= b′1} · (I{a′1 > b′1} − I{a′0 > b′0}) + I{a′0 > b′0}. (6.2)
The two comparisons in Equation 6.2 can be done through oGT, and the preserved additive
homomorphism of oGT allows us to perform the subtraction and addition. The main challenge for
evaluating this equation lies in the computation of the bit I{a′1 6= b′1}, and to multiply this bit to
the output of oGT.
We now show how to compute Enc (I{a′1 6= b′1}) from the ciphertexts Enc
(
Xa
′
1
)
and Enc
(
Xb
′
1
)
.
We also present a method to convert this ciphertext to a oGT-compatible form so that we can
homomorphically multiply Enc (I{a′1 6= b′1}) to the private comparison result, i.e.,
oGT
(
Enc
(
Xa
′
1
)
,Enc
(
Xb
′
1
))
	 oGT
(
Enc
(
Xa
′
0
)
,Enc
(
Xb
′
0
))
.
We can simply compute inequality test through Enc (A) = 1	Enc
(
Xa
′
1
)
⊗Enc
(
X−b
′
1
)
. Specif-
ically, when a′1 6= b′1, A is a polynomial of 1 − Xa
′
1−b′1 6= 0. If a′1 = b′1, A downgrades to zero. In
other words, the 0-th coefficient of A gives the inequality bit I{a′1 6= b′1}.
An encrypted integer value can be multiplied to the output of oGT, and thus is oGT-compatible.
However, the ciphertext Enc (A) above is not oGT-compatible, that is because Enc (A) might encrypt
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a polynomial more than an integer. Thus, we need to convert Enc (A) to an encrypted integer value
if A 6= 0 (i.e., when a′1 6= b′1), otherwise we should obtain a ciphertext of zero. We now show how to
do this conversion.
The core idea is to employ Fermat’s little theorem under the polynomial modulo XN + 1. That
is Ap
d−1 = 1 mod XN + 1 if A 6= 0, where pd = 1 mod m. When A = 0, Apd−1 is still zero.
The naive way needs a multiplicative depth of d log p for computing Enc
(
Ap
d−1
)
from Enc (A).
According to Halevi and Shoup [2014, 2017], we can use automorphisms to reduce this depth. That
is, we first compute the exponent Enc
(
Ap−1
)
from Enc (A) which needs a multiplicative depth of
log2 p. Then we use d automorphism maps Kj : X 7→ Xp
j−1
for 1 ≤ j ≤ d. Finally, the product of
d ciphertexts gives Enc
(
Ap
d−1
)
∏
1≤j≤d
Kj(Enc
(
Ap−1
)
) =
∏
1≤j≤d
Enc
(
A(p−1)p
j−1)
= Enc
(
A(p−1)
∑
j∈[d](p
j−1)
)
= Enc
(
Ap
d−1
)
In total, we need a multiplicative depth of log2 p + log2 d and d automorphisms for this conversion
step.
The FHE parameter p defines the message space which is usually determined by the application
scenario. In order to limit the overhead of this conversion step, we tend choosing such p that d is a
small value, e.g., d = 2.
6.3 Comparison with Other HE-based Solutions
Implementation Details. We instantiated oGT using HElib [Halevi and Shoup, 2017] and SEAL [Chen
et al., 2017] separately. SEAL and HElib use a different representation for representing the plain
polynomials from Zt[X]/(XN +1). HElib’s representation for plain polynomials needs more compu-
tation effort than SEAL. As a result, for the ciphertext-plaintext comparison case, oGT instantiated
from SEAL can provide a better evaluation performance than the HElib based one. However, HE-
lib allows automorphisms which are not supported in SEAL yet. The automorphism allows the
“degree-negating” operation described in Section 3.2.1.
All the programs were written in C++ and compiled with g++-6.3. We ran experiments on a
machine equipped with an Intel Xeon E5-2640 v3@2.60 GHz CPU and 32GB RAM running Ubuntu
14.04
Additive HE Setting. We implement the HE based comparison protocols of Fischlin [2001], Blake
and Kolesnikov [2004], Damg˚ard et al. [2009] using the GMP library. The method in Fischlin [2001]
uses the GM encryption scheme with the AND-gate extension technique [Sander et al., 1999]. The
protocols of Blake and Kolesnikov [2004], Damg˚ard et al. [2009] use an additively HE which was
instantiated as the Paillier encryption [Paillier, 1999]. We also instantiated Damg˚ard et al. [2009]
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with lifted ElGamal over elliptic curves [Shigeo, 2017].
We used two security parameters κ ∈ {80, 128}. We set the public key sizes of {1024, 3072}-bits
for the GM encryption and Paillier encryption, and {160, 256}-bits for the elliptic curve. In addition,
we set λ ∈ {20, 40} in the probabilistic method of Fischlin [2001]. For the FHE scheme, we set the
polynomial degree N = 212 and N = 213.
TFHE Setting. TFHE [Chillotti et al., 2016] also supports output expressive private comparison
by encrypting each bit of a and b and performing gate-level bootstrapping. However, for a relative
small domain, e.g., less than 16 bits, the TFHE-based solution might take a longer evaluation time
than oGT due to the bootstrapping operations.
Measurements. We measured the computation time of three parts: 1) time for encrypting the
inputs, 2) time for evaluating comparison, and 3) time for decrypting the resulting ciphertext(s).
Evaluation Results: Additive Homomorphic Encryption. The experimental results are
reported in Table 6.1. The probabilistic method of Fischlin [2001] is able to compare two encrypted
integers within an error rate of 2−λ. The complexity of this method is linear in λ. As a result,
the method of Fischlin [2001] has high computation and communication complexity for a negligible
error rate, e.g., λ = 40.
For the FF-based implementations, our method outperformed Blake and Kolesnikov [2004], Fis-
chlin [2001], Damg˚ard et al. [2009] in terms of evaluation time. We have two settings, that is
two-ciphertexts case, and single-ciphertext case. In the first case, oGT was about 45 − 90 times
faster than Fischlin [2001]. On the other hand, in the second case, oGT can be 54− 175 times faster
than Blake and Kolesnikov [2004], Damg˚ard et al. [2009] in terms of evaluation time. Notice that,
when only one input was encrypted, oGT itself was even about 5 − 6 times faster than with two
encrypted inputs.
Our method took more evaluation time than the ECC-based implementations of Damg˚ard et al.
[2009], but the performance gap was less than one order of magnitude. Note that the elliptic curve
library (i.e., Shigeo [2017]) we used is better optimized than HElib. By using the more recent
FHE library SEAL, we reduced this performance gap. We thus conclude that our comparison
algorithm that exploits the structure of the polynomial ring Xm + 1 is efficient. Remember that the
output of oGT still offers additive homomorphism, and multiplicative homomorphism under a certain
condition. This property is absent in all previous HE-based solutions and is helpful for constructing
a higher level protocol beyond integer comparison.
Evaluation Results: TFHE. We compared the evaluation time of oGT with the TFHE-based
approach from [Chillotti et al., 2016]. The results are shown in Figure 6.2. For bit length δ ∈
{8, 9, 10}, we used the same parameter N = 210 for oGT due to the 80-bit security level requirement.
We can see that the performance of the TFHE method increased linearly with the bit length while our
method increased exponentially. Also, the current TFHE implementation is a symmetric encryption
scheme while oGT was instantiated with an asymmetric scheme. Even though, for small domains
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Table 6.1: Experimentally comparing oGT with previous HE-based private comparison protocols. δ
denotes the input bit length. κ is the security parameter. FF and ECC mean that the protocols were
instantiated with a finite filed scheme and an elliptic curve scheme, respectively. Timing numbers
were measured as the mean of a thousand runs.
δ, κ Method ENC (ms)
EVAL (ms)
DEC (ms)
ctxt–ctxt ctxt–plain
12, 80
Fischlin [2001] (λ = 20, FF) 18.63 574.44 - 2.93
Fischlin [2001] (λ = 40, FF) 18.87 1164.23 - 3.291
Blake and Kolesnikov [2004] (FF) 22.27 - 115.98 20.54
Damg˚ard et al. [2009] (FF) 26.50 - 54.24 16.99
Damg˚ard et al. [2009] (ECC) 0.83 - 0.799 0.45
Ours (HElib) 2.93 13.07 2.28 1.68
Ours (SEAL) 6.97 - 1.00 0.60
13, 128
Fischlin [2001] (λ = 20, FF) 21.77 672.96 - 63.80
Fischlin [2001] (λ = 40, FF) 21.78 1346.97 - 64.97
Blake and Kolesnikov [2004] (FF) 437.77 - 2224.54 410.32
Damg˚ard et al. [2009] (FF) 352.24 - 705.61 340.58
Damg˚ard et al. [2009] (ECC) 2.11 - 1.98 1.10
Ours (HElib) 6.17 28.22 4.68 3.65
Ours (SEAL) 16.54 - 4.04 2.20
(i.e., less than 16-bits), our method was more than 5 – 500 times faster than TFHE. We admit that
for a larger input bit length, the TFHE method will outperform oGT, while for applications that
require only a relatively small domain, oGT can be more efficient.
6.4 Application: Privacy-preserving Outsourcing Decision Tree
Evaluation
6.4.1 Problem Statements
Decision tree is a fundamental and popularly used classification algorithm, in which a number of
comparisons are evaluated between the elements of an input vector. A decision tree T : Zγ →
{1, 2, · · · , ζ} can be viewed as a function that maps from a γ-dimensional feature space to ζ classes.
The feature space is typically Rγ , and we use fixed-point representation to handle real numbers in
FHE. Then client’s query a ∈ Zγ is designated as feature vector. The decision tree T is a binary-tree
consists of internal nodes and leaf nodes. Let the number of internal nodes be M ′, then the number
of leaf nodes is M ′ + 1. Each internal node vk is attached with a threshold τk ∈ Z and a predicate
fk(a) = I{a[ik] > τk}, where 1 ≤ ik ≤ γ is an index of the feature vector (different internal nodes
can have the same index). Each leaf node ul is attached with an output label zl ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ζ}.
To evaluate the decision tree on an query x ∈ Zγ , we begin from the root node (i.e., v1), and at
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Figure 6.2: Evaluation time of oGT and the bit-wise solution from TFHE [Chillotti et al., 2016] for
comparing two encrypted values aspect to various bit length.
each internal node vk, we compute the predicate fk(a). According to the result of fk(a), we choose
either the left (i.e., fk(a) = 0) or right childnode of vk. This process is repeated until a leaf node
ul∗ is reached. The output T (a) is the label zl∗ of the leaf node ul∗ . The depth of tree T is defined
as the length of the longest path from the root node to a leaf node.
The entity that owns the decision tree model (i.e., {τk ∈ Zp}k∈[M ′]) is called model holder.
Privacy of the decision tree model requires the values of τk to be kept secret.
6.4.2 Existing Private Decision Tree Evaluation Protocols
Existing protocols such as [Bost et al., 2015, Tai et al., 2017] are usually designed as a two-party
computation protocol, in which a client sends its input a to a model holder, who holds the thresholds
{τk}, for the classification label of a. These protocols offer privacy to both the client and the model
holder. That is, after the execution of the protocol, the model holder does not learn about the
client’s input a, except the number of features (i.e., input privacy), while the client learns nothing
about the thresholds {τk}, except the result label (i.e., model privacy). However, the existing private
decision tree evaluation protocols require multiple rounds of interaction between the model holder
and the client.
6.4.3 New Non-interactive Private Decision Tree Evaluation Protocol
We can obtain a non-interactive variant protocol of Tai et al. [2017] by instantiating the private
comparison with oGT, as opposed to Tai et al. [2017] which used the DGK’s private comparison
protocol [Damg˚ard et al., 2009]. The other parts of our protocol are identical to the semi-honest
protocol of [Tai et al., 2017].
By replacing the DGK’s private comparison with oGT, our protocol is superior to its origin [Tai
et al., 2017] in two points. The first is that our protocol allows the client to be oﬄine after he has
sent the ciphertexts of a to the evaluator. The second is that our protocol allows the model holder to
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Protocol ΠPDT
Input of client: feature vector a ∈ Zγm, key pairs sk, pk
Input of server: decision tree T
Output of client: classification result T (a)
Client:
1. Client sends ciphertexts {Enc (Xai)}i∈[γ] to the server attached with his public key pk.
Server:
2. For each internal node vk, the server calls oGT of Figure 6.1
Enc (Ak) = oGT(Enc (X
aik ) , Xτk ).
3. For each path path(ul), the server aggregates ciphertexts along the path
Enc
(
A′l
)
=
∑
wb
k
∈path(ul)
Enc (Ak)	
∑
wb
k
∈path(ul)
I{b = 1}
Enc (Al) = Enc
(
A′l
)⊗ r ⊕ zl, r U←− Zt/{0}
Enc
(
Aˆl
)
= Enc
(
A′l
)⊗ r′, r′ U←− Zt/{0}
4. The server sends ciphertexts {(Enc (Al) ,Enc(Aˆl))}1≤l≤M′+1 to the client,
Client:
5. Client decrypts the ciphertexts received from the server to M ′+1 pairs of polynomials i.e., (Al, Aˆl)
for 1 ≤ l ≤ M ′ + 1. Client outputs the predication result as the first coefficient of Al∗ [0] for a
index l∗ such that Aˆl∗ [0] = 0.
Figure 6.3: Private Decision Tree Evaluation Protocol ΠPDT.
delegate the evaluation to a third-party evaluator, e.g., a public cloud server, without compromising
the model privacy. That is, the model holder can encrypt the thresholds {τk}, and place the cipher-
texts on the public cloud. Then the cloud can process classification upon the (encrypted) request
from the client using the ciphertexts of {τk} for the model holder. Also, during the classification
process, no interaction between the cloud, the model holder and the clients is needed.
Path. We assign an indicator to each branch of the decision tree. Specifically, for an internal node
vk, we write w
b
k (b ∈ {0, 1}) to denote its left branch and right branch, respectively. Then we have a
unique path path(ul) from the root node to each leaf node. We perform homomorphic summations
along the path of each leaf node in a way that the summation along the predication path path(ul∗)
evaluates to zero, while that of other paths are non-zero. This allows the client to learn T (a). Our
ΠPDT protocol of Figure 6.3 requires only one round-trip communication between the client and the
server, as opposed to two round-trips of Tai et al. [2017].
Theorem 14. The protocol ΠPDT of Figure 6.3 privately implements the decision tree functionality
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Table 6.2: Comparing total computation time of ΠPDT with Tai et al. [2017]. γ and M
′ respectively
denotes the number of features and the number of internal nodes of the decision tree. δ is the input
bit length.
Data set (γ,M ′) Ours (δ = 13) Tai et al. [2017] (δ = 64)
Heart-disease (13, 5) 0.59s 0.25s
Housing (13, 92) 10.27s 1.98s
Spambase (57, 58) 6.88s 1.80s
Artificial (16, 500) 56.37s 10.42s
Table 6.3: Performance of our ΠPDT protocol on the trained decision tree model. The feasible domain
of oGT was N = 213.
Data set ENC EVAL DEC
Heart-disease 44.18± 2.59 ms 0.32± 0.06 s 0.32± 0.06 s
Housing 46.35± 3.71 ms 5.11± 0.08 s 5.12± 0.08 s
Spambase 193.58± 7.27 ms 3.34± 0.07 s 3.35± 0.07 s
Artificial 54.62± 1.96 ms 28.16± 0.61 s 28.15± 0.61 s
T under the semi-honest model.
Proof. (Correctness.) Since oGT correctly implements the greater than functionality, and additive
homomorphism is preserved, we have A′l[0] = αl mod p by using µ0 = 0 and µ1 = 1. Thereby
Al[0] = αl ·r+zl mod p and Aˆl[0] = αl ·r′ mod p with non-zero random values r and r′. The client,
thus can learn zl∗ by finding 1 ≤ l∗ ≤M ′ + 1 such that Aˆl∗ [0] = 0. It suffices to prove that αl∗ = 0
and αl 6= 0 for all l 6= l∗. From the definition of decision tree and path, it is easy to see b = fk(a)
for wbk ∈ path(ul∗). We can see that αl∗ =
∑
wbk∈path(ul∗ ) b = 0. On the other hand, for l 6= l
∗, we
have b = 1 − fk(a) for wkb ∈ path(ul)/path(ul∗). In this case, 0 < |αl| ≤ |path(ul)/path(ul∗)|, and
thus αl 6= 0 for all other paths that l 6= l∗.
6.4.4 Evaluation
We trained decision tree models through the scikit-learn library on three real data sets from the
UCI repository Lichman [2013]. We also used an artificial data to show the scalability of our ΠPDT
protocol.
• Heart-disease: γ = 13 and M ′ = 5.
• Housing : γ = 13 and M ′ = 92.
• Spambase: γ = 57 and M ′ = 58.
• Artificial: γ = 16 and M ′ = 500.
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Here γ and M ′ respectively denotes the number of features and the number of internal nodes of the
decision tree. Note that in the training phase was done on plain data without any crypto.
Measurements. We measured the performance of our ΠPDT protocol for the case that both the
client’s input and the tree model are encrypted. In particular, we measured the encryption and
decryption time on the client’s side, and the evaluation time on the cloud’s side.
Empirical Results. The benchmark performance of our ΠPDT protocol on the trained models
are given in Table 6.3. The evaluation time on the server’s side was linear with the number of
internal nodes N , which can be accelerated easily through multi-threads. However, the client needs
to decrypt O(2N) ciphertexts which still takes high computation effort.
Comparison with the-State-of-the-Art. We also compared our protocol to its origin [Tai et al.,
2017], which is the most efficient HE-based private decision tree protocol. Remind that, in [Tai
et al., 2017], the model thresholds {τk} were plaintext due to the DGK’s private comparison, while
in our protocol both the client’s input and the model thresholds were encrypted. The performance
details are shown in Table 6.2. We can see that the performance gap between our protocol and [Tai
et al., 2017], was smaller than than 25-fold, counting the differences of bit length δ. Our protocol
can be hosted on a public cloud. Thus we can take advantage of the abundant computing resources
of the cloud to easily accelerate the protocol execution, e.g., by parallelism.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we tackle the problem of secure computation on the cloud. We have shown that
with appropriate packing methods, FHE-based protocols can be feasible for cloud applications. Our
contributions in this dissertation are summarized as follows.
Private Inner Product of Long Vectors. In Chapter 3, we deal with a problem of computing
the inner product of two encrypted large size vectors. As we have shown, the naive approach would
be too expensive to use. To overcome this difficulty, we propose forward backward packing, which
encodes long vectors as polynomials before encryption, and it enables us to compute the inner
product of the vectors with a much smaller number of homomorphic multiplications. Specifically,
the number of homomorphic multiplications are reduced from O(n) to O(n/N) where n is the size of
vectors and N is the FHE parameter. As a concrete application, we show how to use the proposed
inner product protocol to conduct secure χ2 test and linkage equilibrium (Figure 3.4) with a large
clinical and genomic data, on the cloud. Empirical results show that our approach is about 2000×
faster than the previous cryptographic solution for χ2 and linkage equilibrium.
Iterative Computation on Encrypted Vectors. In Chapter 4, we present three feasible FHE
primitives, i.e., ΠMP, ΠbGT and ΠoGT, which enable us to perform iterative computation on encrypted
vectors, including matrix multiplication and greater than. Using these primitives, we develop a
framework of secure outsourcing statistical analysis to the cloud. Specifically, we show how to
evaluate descriptive and predictive statistics from encrypted values, including mean, covariance,
histogram, contingency table with cell suppression, k-percentile, decision tree, principal component
analysis and linear regression. The experiment results show that FHE is usable for non-trivial cloud
applications when appropriate packings and encoding methods are used.
Communication Efficient Secure Matrix Multiplication. In Chapter 5, we present a commu-
nication efficient secure inner product protocol via a newly proposed double packing. The proposed
protocol enables a communication efficient matrix multiplication protocol (ΠSMP of Figure 5.3),
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which reduces the cubic communication overhead of the previous method to a quadratic communi-
cation overhead. Empirically, the amount of data transferred by Figure 5.3 was only 1.9% of the
existing OT-based methods. As a concrete application, we employ the protocol ΠSMP to two existing
privacy-preserving machine learning frameworks, i.e., MiniONN and SecureML. Experiment results
show that our protocol can save more than 90% communication cost of these frameworks while keep-
ing a comparable computation time. We consider that ΠSMP can help forwarding the development
of more practical and useable privacy-preserving machine learning cloud-based applications.
Appendix A
Techniques to Implement Fast
Homomorphic Encryption
A good programming implementation of the underlying FHE library is also critical. In this chapter,
we introduce some techniques that help us to write efficient codes that implement BGV’s scheme.
A.1 Polynomial Multiplication
The most important operation of constructing the BGV scheme (and other ring-based homomorphic
encryption) is multiplication of polynomials modulo XN + 1 and some prime t, i.e.,
A ·B mod (XN + 1, t)
for polynomials A,B ∈ At. The naive polynomial multiplication takes O(N2) operations which
might be impractical, since the parameter N of an FHE scheme is usually large, e.g., N = 213. The
discrete Fourier transform (also named as number theoretic transform) is the classic algorithm to
perform fast polynomial multiplications. Let NTT : At 7→ ZNt as the forward transform, and denote
NTT−1 as the backward transform. NTT has the following property.
NTT−1(NTT(A) ◦ NTT(B)) = A ·B mod (XN + 1, t),
where ◦ is the element-wise multiplication of vectors. By using fast Fourier transform, such as Cooley-
Tukey algorithm [Cooley and Stern, 1965], the forward and backward transform take O(N log2N)
operations. Since the element-wise multiplication is linear, the polynomial multiplication can be
done within O(N log2N) operations.
A classic NTT algorithm that uses Cooley-Tukey needs to bit-reversed reorder the coefficients
80
APPENDIX A. TECHNIQUES TO IMPLEMENT FAST HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 81
Protocol NTT on the Cooley-Tukey Butterfly
Inputs: Polynomial A :=
∑N−1
i=0 aiX
i where N is power of 2 and t = 1 mod 2N . The 2N -th primitive
root of unit ψ aspect to t. A pre-computed table Ψ ∈ ZNt stores powers of ψ in bit-reversed order.
1. For 0 ≤ m < log2 N do
2. n = 2log2 N−m−1
3. For 0 ≤ i < 2m do
3.1. d = 2 · i · n
3.2. η = Ψ[2m + i]
3.3. For 0 ≤ k < n do [
ad+k
ad+k+n
]
= η ·
[
ad+k + ad+k+n
ad+k − ad+k+n
]
mod t (A.1)
4. Output {ai} for 0 ≤ i < N .
Figure A.1: Forward Number Theoretic Transform
{ai} and multiplying the coefficients with the 2N -th primitive root of unit. Indeed we can save
these operations by mixing up two kinds of butterflies, i.e., using Cooley-Tukey butterfly in NTT
and using Gentleman-Sande butterfly in INTT [Longa and Naehrig, 2016].
We can see from Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 that the most basic operation of the NTT is the
so-called butterfly operation (Equation A.1), i.e., (x, y) → (x + y, w · (x − y)). Notice that, the
additions and multiplications are performed over the finite field Zt. We use the optimization from
Harvey [2014] for the butterfly operation.
A.1.1 Faster Butterfly for Number Theoretic Transforms
The naive implementation of Equation A.1 would need three correction steps to make sure the results
are inside the range [0, t). However, these correction steps would introduce a large overhead due
to branch misprediction. Harvey [2014] proposes a method to eliminate two of them. Figure A.3
follows the optimized butterfly proposed by Harvey [2014] which also leverages Shoup’s trick for
multiplication reduction. That is, we tend to choose β as power of 2 so that the division and modulo
by β can be done with cheap bit-wise shift and mask operations, respectively.
A.2 Residue Number System
Multi-word values are necessary for constructing BGV’s scheme. That is, the value in the moduli
chain q0 < q1 < · · · < qL is usually large, e.g., qL > 2300. From the view of programming,
we can use multi-precision library such as the GMP library for this. However, these multi-word
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Protocol NTT−1 on the Gentleman Sande Butterfly
Inputs: Vector a := [a0, a1, · · · aN−1] ∈ ZNt in bit-reversed ordering, where N is power of 2 and
t = 1 mod 2N . The inverse of the 2N -th primitive root of unit ψ−1 mod t. A pre-computed table
Ψ−1 ∈ ZNt stores the power of ψ−1 in the bit-reversed order.
Output: NTT−1(a) in standard ordering.
1. For 0 ≤ m < log2 N do
2. h = 2log2 N−m−1
3. For 0 ≤ i < h do
3.1. η = Ψ−1[h+ i]
3.2. d = 2 · i · 2m
– For 0 ≤ k < 2m do [
ad+k
ad+k+2m
]
=
[
ad+k + ad+k+2m
η · (ad+k − ad+k+2m)
]
mod t
4. Output {ai ·N−1 mod t} for 0 ≤ i < N .
Figure A.2: Backward Number Theoretic Transform
implementations are usually a few magnitudes slower than the naive machine word operations. We
introduce an alternative method to achieve multi-word precision using the naive machine word only.
Before describing the alternative method, we need some notations.
• Let p1, p2, · · · , pk be k prime numbers that fix into a machine word.
– Let p be the product of these k primes, i.e., p =
∏
i pi.
– Let p∗i = p/pi ∈ Z and p˜i = (p∗i )−1 mod pi, i.e., p˜i · p∗i = 1 mod pi.
• For an integer 0 ≤ x < p, we write [x]p to represent the vector
[x1, x2, · · · , xk] s.t. xi = x mod pi.
• For a polynomial A ∈ Zp[X]/(XN + 1), we write [A]pi to denote the residue of coefficients of
A aspect to pi, i.e., [A]pi = [A[0] mod pi, A[1] mod pi, · · · , A[N − 1] mod pi].
Indeed, [x]p is so-called residue number system (RNS) of x. For the RNS representation of values
0 ≤ x, y < p, we have the following properties.
[x]p +˙ [y]p = [x+ y mod p]p
[x]p ◦ [y]p = [x× y mod p]p,
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Protocol Harvey’s Butterfly
Inputs: 0 < η < t, η′ = bη · β/tc for some β > 4t. 0 ≤ x, y < 2t.
Outputs: x′ = x+ y mod t and y′ = η · (x− y) mod t.
1. x′ = x+ y
• if x′ ≥ 2t then x′ = x′ − 2t.
2. q = bη′ · T/βc where T = x− y + 2t.
3. y′ = (η · T − q · t) mod β.
Figure A.3: Faster Butterfly for Number Theoretic Transforms
where +˙ and ◦ is the element-wise addition and multiplication of vectors, respectively. In other
words, by using RNS representation, we can achieve multi-word precision for addition and multipli-
cation over the finite field. Most importantly, the RNS representation is compatible with the NTT
algorithm, since NTT algorithm involves only additions and multiplications over the finite field. In
more details, we represent the coefficients of polynomials in the RNS format. At the result, we need
to repeat the NTT algorithm through each residue of the polynomial. Since each residue would not
interleave with each other during the NTT algorithm, we tend to store the RNS representation of
polynomials in the residue-order
[[A]p1 , [A]p2 , · · · , [A]pk ].
Notice that, parallelism can be used to accelerate the NTT algorithm on the RNS formatted poly-
nomials, since each residue is totally independent to each other.
A.2.1 Division on RNS
The homomorphic multiplication of BGV’ scheme involves some kind of division operations, which
is tricky if we use the RNS format, since it preserves only the additive and multiplicative properties.
For a general division operation, we might need to convert back from the RNS format to a multi-
precision format such as using GMP, and then perform the division and then convert back to the
RNS format. Fortunately, the division needed in the BGV’s scheme is not that general. It has
some constructive properties. We now introduce the rescale routine from Halevi et al. [2018], which
allows us to perform the needed division operation in the homomorphic multiplication without using
multi-precision values.
Let x ∈ Zp be given in the RNS format [x1, x2, · · · , xk], and let p′ ∈ Z be an integer modulus
p′ > 2. We want to “scale-down” x by a factor p′/p, namely to compute the integer y = dp′/p · xc ∈
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Zp′ .
y := dp
′
p
xc = d(
∑
i
xi · p˜i · p∗i ·
p′
p
)− v′ · p · p
′
p
c
= d
∑
i
xi · (p˜i · p
′
pi
)c − v′ · p′ = d
∑
i
xi · (p˜i · p
′
pi
)c mod p′
The first equation comes from the fact that x =
∑
i xi · p˜i · p∗i − v′ · p for some v′ ∈ Z. In the
context of homomorphic multiplication, we can pre-process the rational numbers p′ · q˜i/qi ∈ [0, p′),
and separate into their integer and fractional parts:
p′ · q˜i/qi = αi + βi, with αi ∈ Zp′ and βi ∈ [0, 1).
With (αi, βi) pre-computed, we can rescale x to y via two sums: α =
∑
i xi · αi mod p′ and β =
d∑i xi · βc, and then output y = α+ β mod p′.
A.2.2 Barrett Reduction
Barrett reduction [Barrett, 1986] is a fast method used to perform x mod t, assuming 0 ≤ x < t2
and t is constant. The general idea behinds Barrett reduction is to compute x − bx · sc · t where
s ≈ 1
t
. As long as s is computed with sufficient accuracy, this result is exact. However division can
be expensive. On the other hand, Barrett reduction approximates 1/t with a value t′/2k with an
approximation parameter k. Division by 2k is just a right-shift and thus is cheap. The value t′ is
generally set as t′ = b2k/tc. Given t′ and k, Barrett reduction on 0 ≤ x < t2 is working as follows.
1. q = (x · t′) k.
2. y = x− q · t.
3. output y if y < t, otherwise output y − t.
For a larger k, we have a better approximation, and we need to make sure that the approximation
is good enough for reducing values in the range [0, t2), which is required by the lazy reduction
technique in the next section. Suppose the machine word size is w and the limb size of t is w′, i.e.,
t < 2w
′ ≤ 2w. We use a large approximation parameter, i.e, k = 2w. Notice that, using a such large
k, the multiplication x · t′ will result at a multi-word value. To avoid using multi-precision library,
we need one more constraint on the limb size w, i.e., w′ ≤ w − 2, but now we can only store the
lowest w-bit of b2k/tc because 2k/t > 2w. The Barrett reduction we used is given as follows.
Setup: Suppose that k = 2w and t < 2w
′
. Let t˜ the lowest w-bit of b2k/tc and δ = w − w′.
1. q = (t˜ · (x w) + (x δ)) w.
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2. y = x− q · t.
3. output y if y < t, otherwise output y − t.
The correctness of Step 1 can be seen as follows. In the origin Barrett reduction, the step (x · t′) k
is computing the highest w-bit of (x · t′), since k = 22w is used. Also, we have t′ = 2δ · 2w + t˜ with
t˜ < 2w. In other words, t′ is represented in its w-radix format. We can rewrite 0 ≤ x < 22w′ in
its w-radix format, i.e., x = 2w · x1 + x0 for 0 ≤ x0, x1 < 2w. Thereby the multiplication x · t′ is
decomposed as
x · t′ = (x1 · 2w + x0) · (2δ · 2w + t˜)
= (2δ · x1) · 22w + (2δ · x0 + t˜ · x1) · 2w + x0 · t˜
The highest w-bit is 2δ ·x1 + (2δ ·x0 +x1 · t˜) w which equals to (2δ · 2w ·x1 + 2δ ·x0 + t˜ ·x1) w,
and which is exactly ((x δ) + t˜ · (x w)) w.
A.2.3 Lazy Reduction
Lazy reduction is used to speed up “inner product” computation over the finite filed, such as
∑
i xi ·
yi mod t for xi, yi ∈ Zt. We tend to defer the modulo reduction for each multiplication, and perform
just a single modulo reduction after the summation. To do so, we need to present double machine-
word. For example, if xi, yi < 2
64 then we need a data structure to represent 128-bit integers.
Indeed, during the computation of inner product, we do need some modulo reduction, since we need
to make sure no overflow is incurred from the summations. The number of summations we can skip
before the modulo reduction depends on the limb size of t. Suppose the machine word size is w and
the limb size of t is w′, i.e., t < 2w
′ ≤ 2w. The number of summations we can skip is 22w′−2w − 1.
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